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Judicial Retention Elections, the Rule of Law,
and the Rhetorical Weaknesses of
Consequentialism
TODD E. PETTYS†
INTRODUCTION
What a difference a year makes. Prior to 2010, most of
the controversy surrounding judicial retention elections
concerned their longstanding failure to attract the attention
of the electorate. Critics complained that those elections
were “issueless and lack-luster” affairs, incapable of
drawing voters‟ interest; they worried that the small
handful of citizens who bothered to cast ballots relied “too
heavily” upon the results of attorney-polls conducted by bar
associations; and they argued that retention elections
practically resulted in life tenure for those judges who did
not have to endure any greater scrutiny in order to keep
their jobs.1 Writing in 2009, one scholar summed up the
charge this way: “[R]etention elections are something of a
fraud. They create a false veneer of democracy at the
judicial retention stage that the bar can use to distract the
populace from the elitism of bar power at the initial
selection stage, which is where the real action is.”2 Between
† Associate Dean for Faculty and H. Blair and Joan V. White Professor of Law,
University of Iowa College of Law. The author thanks the participants in the
Iowa Legal Studies Workshop for their helpful comments on an earlier draft,
and Karen Anderson for her extraordinary research assistance.
1. Susan B. Carbon, Judicial Retention Elections: Are They Serving Their
Intended Purpose?, 64 JUDICATURE 210, 216-18 (1980); see also William K. Hall
& Larry T. Aspin, What Twenty Years of Judicial Retention Elections Have Told
Us, 70 JUDICATURE 340, 342-43 (1987) (recounting comparable criticisms).
2. Stephen J. Ware, The Missouri Plan in National Perspective, 74 MO. L.
REV. 751, 771 (2009) (footnote omitted); see also Michael R. Dimino, The Futile
Quest for a System of Judicial “Merit” Selection, 67 ALB. L. REV. 803, 811 (2004)
(“[Retention] elections are organized to decrease the likelihood that members of
the public will vote at all. . . . [R]etention elections seek to have the benefit of
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1964 and 2006, for example, roughly one-third of those who
voted in a given election year failed to fill out the portion of
the ballot concerning judicial retention;3 the mean
affirmative vote in retention elections commonly remained
comfortably above 70%;4 and of the 6,306 judges who stood
for retention during that time period, only fifty-six were
defeated—and more than half of those who lost were in
Illinois, where judges seeking retention must win at least
60% of the vote.5
The 2010 elections clearly signaled that, at least so far
as states‟ high courts are concerned, the days of reliably
quiet retention elections are over.6 Voters in Iowa ousted
three members of the Iowa Supreme Court in response to
that court‟s 2009 ruling striking down Iowa‟s ban on samesex marriage.7 Organized anti-retention efforts fell shy of
their mark in other states, but the number of those efforts
was unprecedented.8 A group called Alaska Family Action
appearing to involve the public, but in actuality function as a way of blessing
the appointed judge with a false aura of electoral legitimacy.” (footnote
omitted)).
3. See Larry Aspin, Judicial Retention Election Trends: 1964-2006, 90
JUDICATURE 208, 209 (2007).
4. See id.
5. See id. at 210; see also ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 12(d).
6. See generally Press Release, Brennan Center for Justice, 2010 Judicial
Elections Increase Pressure on Courts, Reform Groups Say (Nov. 3, 2010),
http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-/Democracy/release-november%202010110310-final.pdf (“Election Day 2010 brought a new round of special interest
money, nasty ads and wedge issue politics into America‟s courtrooms, breaking
several spending records and spreading costly, ideological hardball campaigns
into new states. . . . But organized efforts to unseat high court justices failed in
Illinois, Colorado, Alaska, Kansas and Florida.”).
7. See A.G. Sulzberger, In Iowa, Voters Oust Judges Over Marriage Issue,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/03/us/politics/
03judges.html; see also Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 872 (Iowa 2009)
(“[W]e hold the Iowa marriage statute violates the equal protection clause of the
Iowa Constitution.”). For a discussion of the retention battle in Iowa, see
generally Todd E. Pettys, Letter from Iowa: Same-Sex Marriage and the Ouster
of Three Justices, 59 KAN. L. REV. 715, 722-36 (2011).
8. See Roy A. Schotland, Iowa‟s 2010 Judicial Election: Appropriate
Accountability or Rampant Passion?, 46 CT. REV. 118, 118 (2011) (“[T]he 2010
judicial election cycle was unique: never before had so many states had
organized opposition to a justice up for retention . . . .”).
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Inc. narrowly failed in its bid to remove Justice Dana Fabe
from the Alaska Supreme Court for her votes in cases
dealing with abortion and other matters.9 Members of Clear
the Bench Colorado led an anti-retention campaign against
three justices who sat on what these unhappy voters called
the “most activist” state supreme court in the country.10 A
Tea Party-affiliated group called Citizen2Citizen led the
fight to oust Justices Jorge Labarga and James Perry from
the Florida Supreme Court for not allowing citizens to vote
on a proposed constitutional amendment that would have
barred the state from requiring individuals to buy health
insurance.11 The Illinois Civil Justice League cited concerns
about tort damages and the treatment of criminal
defendants in its bitter campaign to remove Chief Justice
Thomas Kilbride from the Illinois Supreme Court.12 The
9. See Tracy Kalytiak, Mailer Targets Justice Fabe, MAT-SU VALLEY
FRONTIERSMAN (Oct. 28, 2010, 9:49 PM), http://www.frontiersman.com/articles/
2010/10/29/local_news/doc4cca5393300d5949412875.txt. Justice Fabe prevailed
with a slim 53.2% majority. See Nov. 2 Judicial Elections Roundup, NAT‟L CTR.
FOR STATE COURTS, http://www.ncsc.org/conferences-and-events/nov-2-judicialelections-roundup.aspx (last updated Nov. 17, 2010).
10. See Colorado‟s Supreme Court Is Still Out of Control, CLEAR THE BENCH
COLORADO, http://www.clearthebenchcolorado.org (last visited Nov. 12, 2011);
see also Felisa Cardona, Justices Face Stiff Retention Criticism, DENV. POST,
Oct. 3, 2010, at B6. One of the organization‟s primary complaints concerned the
Colorado Supreme Court‟s role in increasing the tax burden for many citizens of
Colorado. See Colorado‟s Supreme Court Is Still Out of Control, supra. The three
justices were retained with affirmative votes ranging from 59% to 62%. See Nov.
2 Judicial Elections Roundup, supra note 9.
11. See William Gibson, Tea Partiers Campaign Against Justices,
SUNSENTINEL.COM, (Sept. 21, 2010, 12:52 PM), http://weblogs.sun-sentinel.com/
news/politics/dcblog/2010/09/tea_partiers_campaign_against.html.
Justices
Labarga and Perry were retained with affirmative votes of 58.9% and 61.7%,
respectively. See Nov. 2 Judicial Elections Roundup, supra note 9. Justice
Labarga‟s margin of victory was the lowest in the state‟s history. See Jane
Musgrave, Hostility to Judges a Dangerous Sign?, PALM BEACH POST, Nov. 14,
2010, at 1A.
12. See David Kidwell, In Group‟s Attack Ads, “Criminals” Bash Jurist;
Backers of Jury-Award Caps Run Radio Spots Attempting to Oust High Court
Judge, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 22, 2010, at C1. The Illinois Civil Justice League‟s
complaints about the treatment of criminal defendants were a little
disingenuous—the League‟s primary concern was Chief Justice Kilbride‟s votes
in cases dealing with tort damages, but they focused on criminal matters in an
effort to stir up voters‟ passions. See Schotland, supra note 8, at 125. Chief
Justice Kilbride was retained with an affirmative vote of 66%. See Nov. 2
Judicial Elections Roundup, supra note 9. That result is closer than it initially
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anti-abortion group Kansans for Life launched what it
dubbed the “Fire Beier” campaign to remove Justice Carol
Beier from the Kansas Supreme Court for her votes on
matters relating to abortion.13
With this surge in organized opposition to appellate
judges who ruled in ways that some voters found
objectionable, many fear that retention elections are now
poised to take on “all the bruising characteristics of regular
head-to-head judicial elections.”14 The worrisome trajectory
that many judges and bar leaders are envisioning is easily
summarized. For much of the nation‟s history, judicial
elections of all kinds were usually “inexpensive, quiet, [and]
uncompetitive.”15 In the 1970s, however, state courts began
to assert themselves in a growing number of areas,
including criminal law, privacy rights, school finance, torts,
appears, given Illinois‟s requirement that judges seeking retention win at least
60% of the vote. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
13. See Kathy Ostrowski, “Fire Beier” Campaign Attacks Justice‟s Abortion
Bias,
KANSANS
FOR
LIFE
BLOG
(Jan.
27,
2010),
http://kansansforlife.wordpress.com/2010/01/27/fire-beier-campaign-attacksjustices-abortion-bias/. That campaign lost steam down the stretch. See Denis
Boyles, Kansas‟ „Fire Beier‟ Campaign Disappears in a Cloud of Smoke, NAT‟L
REV. ONLINE (Oct. 26, 2010), http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/251019/
kansas-fire-beier-campaign-disappears-cloud-smoke-denis-boyles (lamenting the
diminished profile of the campaign against Justice Beier during the weeks
immediately preceding the election). Thirty-seven percent of those casting
ballots nevertheless voted to remove Justice Beier from the bench. See Nov. 2
Judicial Elections Roundup, supra note 9.
14. John Gramlich, Judges‟ Battles Signal a New Era for Retention Elections,
WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2010, at A8 (stating that many “[l]egal experts” hold this
view); see also Editorial, Fair Courts in the Cross-Fire, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29,
2010, at A30 (“[T]he lavish spending by interest groups and the politicization of
state court judgeships is spreading from races between two or more judicial
candidates to the „retention‟ ballots that were supposed to shield judges from the
rough-and-tumble of the election cycle.”).
15. See Owen G. Abbe & Paul S. Herrnson, How Judicial Election Campaigns
Have Changed, 85 JUDICATURE 286, 287 (2002). For a brief discussion of the
historical origins of judicial elections, see Paul D. Carrington, Judicial
Independence and Democratic Accountability in Highest State Courts, 61 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 89-90 (1998). Judicial elections worldwide are quite rare,
occurring outside of the United States only in Switzerland and Japan. See Bert
Brandenburg & Roy A. Schotland, Justice in Peril: The Endangered Balance
Between Impartial Courts and Judicial Election Campaigns, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 1229, 1232-33 (2008).
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welfare, and zoning, among others.16 Political parties,
special-interest organizations, and repeat courtroom players
gradually took notice.17 In 1978, for example, deputy district
attorneys in California provided a harbinger of things to
come when they took the unusual step of recruiting
candidates to run against judicial incumbents.18 Over the
next two decades, many people across the country concluded
“that social, political, business, and environmental issues
decided by elected state supreme court judges were too
important to ignore,” and they directed their political
energies accordingly.19 Judges responded to the new
electoral pressure by dramatically ramping up their
fundraising efforts, thereby laying the groundwork for the
perception, or reality, of judicial bias and conflicts of
interest. Between 2000 and 2009, for example, individuals
seeking seats on their states‟ high courts collectively raised
nearly $210 million for their campaigns, far exceeding the
sum raised in any prior decade.20 As a result of these
developments, judicial elections are now sometimes among
16. See Carrington, supra note 15, at 99-103.
17. See id. at 105-06 (“In response to all this highly visible judicial behavior,
many other political interest groups and parties began about 1980 to take a
heightened interest in judicial elections.”).
18. See TASK FORCE ON LAWYERS‟ POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS, AM. BAR ASS‟N,
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS: PART TWO 13-14 (1998) (stating that the
moment when judicial elections started to heat up “can be dated with unusual
precision,” and tracing that development to the 1978 elections in California).
19. Paul J. De Muniz, Politicizing State Judicial Elections: A Threat to
Judicial Independence, 38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 367, 367-68 (2002); see also
Donald P. Judges, Who Do They Think They Are?, 64 ARK. L. REV. 119, 146-47
(2011) (stating that judicial elections have become increasingly political because
of state courts‟ involvement in recent decades in contentious areas of public
policy, such as abortion, school finance, and tort reform).
20. See JAMES SAMPLE ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, THE NEW POLITICS
JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2000-2009: DECADE OF CHANGE 1 (Charles Hall ed.,
2010), available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/d091dc911bd67ff73b_09m6yvpgv
.pdf; see also id. at 78-85 (providing specific spending figures from numerous
states). The turning point in these fundraising efforts occurred during the 2000
elections, when candidates for seats on state supreme courts raised nearly $50
million for their campaigns, 61% more than state supreme court candidates had
raised during the prior election cycle. Brandenburg & Schotland, supra note 15,
at 1237; see also id. at 1235 (“[A]lthough high court elections began boiling over
in 2000 with more competition, more funding and more intensity, this was
preceded by more than a decade of simmering political and special interest
pressure.”).
OF
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the most costly and hard-fought head-to-head matchups on
voters‟ ballots.
The inventors and early champions of judicial retention
elections hoped to spare state judiciaries from precisely that
kind of intense politicization. Nearly a century ago, Albert
Kales—a law professor at Northwestern University and cofounder of the American Judicature Society—launched a
movement aimed at persuading states to abandon the
practice of filling court vacancies with judicial elections. 21
He urged states to establish nonpartisan bodies for the task
of nominating slates of qualified individuals to fill those
vacancies, with a lone decision-maker then appointing new
judges from the short lists that those nonpartisan bodies
prepared.22 He believed that his “merit-selection” plan
would curb the perceived evils associated with judges who
had to depend upon courting powerful people and winning
elections in order to obtain their seats on the bench. 23
Recognizing that including some sort of opportunity for
voter input would be essential to make the merit-selection
plan politically saleable among early-twentieth-century
Progressives, Kales and other advocates reluctantly added
judicial retention elections to the mix, whereby appointed
judges would appear on voters‟ ballots, unopposed, after a
short initial term of service and again periodically
thereafter.24 But these reformers emphatically hoped that
21. See G. Alan Tarr, Do Retention Elections Work?, 74 MO. L. REV. 605, 60809 (2009).
22. Rachel Paine Caufield, How the Pickers Pick: Finding a Set of Best
Practices for Judicial Nominating Commissions, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 163,
169-70 (2007). Under Kales‟s original plan, a council of sitting judges would
prepare the slates and a state‟s chief justice would be the one ultimately
responsible for choosing new judges from the council‟s lists. See Glenn R.
Winters, The Merit Plan for Judicial Selection and Tenure—Its Historical
Development, 7 DUQ. L. REV. 61, 66-67 (1968). Subsequent reformers proposed
that the slates be prepared by judicial nominating commissions and that a
state‟s governor be the one charged with making the final selections. See id. at
67-70. Kales‟s plan, thus amended, generally held that shape going forward,
leaving individual states to tinker with the details in various ways. See id. at
70-74.
23. See Tarr, supra note 21, at 607-08.
24. Carbon, supra note 1, at 215; see also Luke Bierman, Beyond Merit
Selection, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 851, 853-57 (2002); Carbon, supra note 1, at
220-21, 233; Hall & Aspin, supra note 1, at 340-42; Tarr, supra note 21, at 60709.
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retention elections would be uneventful and quiet, with
voters rising up to oust judges only in rare cases of
egregious misconduct.25
Numerous state lawmakers found those proposals
persuasive. Today, roughly half of the nation‟s states use
some version of a merit-selection process to appoint at least
some of their judges, and most of those states ask their
appointed judges to stand in periodic retention elections, as
well.26 In the other half of the nation‟s states, contested
elections remain the primary means by which judicial
vacancies are filled in the first instance.27 In a few of those
states, the winners of those contested elections then
periodically must stand unopposed in retention elections in
order to retain their seats.28
The 2010 elections demonstrate that judges in
retention-election states can no longer rest comfortably on
25. See Carrington, supra note 15, at 97. Indeed, many champions of the
merit-selection process hoped that states might eventually abandon judicial
retention elections altogether. See Tarr, supra note 21, at 609.
26. See Methods of Judicial Selection, AM. JUDICATURE SOC‟Y,
http://www.judicialselection.us (follow “Selection of Judges” hyperlink) (last
visited Nov. 12, 2011) (indicating that twenty-four states use some version of
merit-selection, and that of those states, sixteen hold retention elections); see
also Bierman, supra note 24, at 857-59 (providing a brief overview of the
different types of merit-selection systems currently in place). The American Bar
Association threw its weight behind the merit-selection and retention-election
concepts in 1937, Missouri became the first state to adopt that package of
reforms for some of its judges in 1940, and numerous other states followed suit
in the decades that followed. Caufield, supra note 22, at 170-71. In more recent
years, the move to merit-selection systems has lost some of its steam, as citizens
have become increasingly aware of the power that judges wield and have
concluded that “political power would be transferred from themselves to those
who do the merit selecting.” Paul D. Carrington & Adam R. Long, The
Independence and Democratic Accountability of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 30
CAP. U. L. REV. 455, 469 (2002).
27. See Methods of Judicial Selection, supra note 26 (indicating that twentytwo states select their judges through contested elections). A small number of
states rely on other mechanisms to fill judicial vacancies, such as legislative
elections or legislative confirmation of gubernatorial appointments. See id.
(indicating that four states—Maine, New Jersey, South Carolina, and Virginia—
use one of these alternate methods).
28. See id. (explaining that in Illinois, New Mexico, and Pennsylvania,
judicial vacancies are filled through partisan elections, but the winners of those
contests subsequently retain their seats on the bench if they prevail in
uncontested retention elections).
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the assumption that voters will routinely exempt them from
meaningful scrutiny.29 For those who believe that heavily
politicized judicial elections are a threat to state courts‟
integrity and independence—and such individuals certainly
predominate in the circles in which state judges, bar
leaders, and legal academics commonly run30—this is
troubling news indeed. Just like judges who must win and
hold their seats in head-to-head matchups in other states,
judges who formally stand unopposed in retention elections
must now think seriously about launching ambitious
fundraising campaigns, and they must wrestle more
strenuously with the temptation to decide cases in ways
that will play well on Election Day.
In this Article, I do not take issue with the claim that
these are distressing developments.31 I do, however, push
back against the common wisdom in legal circles by arguing
that the leading rhetorical strategies of those who seek to
defend judges against anti-retention campaigns are
fundamentally misguided.
As I explain in Part I, targeted judges and their
defenders typically try to deflect voters‟ attention from the
29. See supra notes 6-13 and accompanying text (noting anti-retention efforts
in numerous states).
30. One scholar writes:
Many legal academics and the majority of the judiciary itself
view judicial selection by election as inimical to values of judicial
independence. The elected-judge paradigm has been criticized
repeatedly in the popular media, through bar association
publications, and in law reviews. Defenders argue the system is as
good as or better than any other, but this is a decidedly minority
view among anyone with a law degree.
Meryl J. Chertoff, Trends in Judicial Selection in the States, 42 MCGEORGE L.
REV. 47, 47 (2010) (footnote omitted); see also id. at 57-59 (noting the
widespread hope in such circles that more states will abandon contested judicial
elections and will move instead to a merit-selection and retention-election
system); Joanna M. Shepherd, Money, Politics, and Impartial Justice, 58 DUKE
L.J. 623, 625 (2009) (“For many academics, elite lawyers, and federal judges, it
is an assumed truth that judges should be protected completely from public
influence.”).
31. The story of judicial elections is not, however, as one-sided as the critics of
such elections might have one believe. See David E. Pozen, Judicial Elections as
Popular Constitutionalism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 2047, 2068-86 (2010)
(identifying potentially desirable attributes of high-profile judicial elections).
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merits of any particular rulings that have drawn voters‟
ire.32 Rather than defend targeted judges‟ reasoning in
controversial cases, pro-retention forces typically advance a
set of case-transcending deontological and consequentialist
arguments. When describing pro-retention arguments as
deontological, I mean simply to denote arguments that do
not draw their strength from claims about consequences. 33
(A deontological argument against murder might posit, for
example, that murder inherently violates the victim‟s
autonomy and dignity, while a consequentialist argument
might posit that murder robs society of the contributions
that the victim might otherwise have made.) Deontological
arguments in favor of judges‟ retention rely upon the claim
that ousting judges in response to their controversial
rulings is intrinsically inconsistent with the rule of law and
reflects a failure to understand the work that we rely upon
judges to do.34 Consequentialist pro-retention arguments
contend that, if voters oust a judge because they find some
of his or her rulings objectionable, then a variety of
undesirable consequences will follow—other judges, for
example, will frustrate the rule of law by letting the fear of
political consequences influence their reasoning, or will feel
compelled to develop conflict-producing relationships with
powerful donors.35
I argue in Part II that the deontological arguments
usually lack merit. Setting consequentialist concerns aside,
voting to oust a judge because one finds some of his or her
rulings objectionable is perfectly consistent with a
commitment to the rule of law, except in the rare
circumstances that I describe. With respect to the
consequentialist arguments, I argue in Part III that, even if
those arguments are analytically meritorious, stubborn
psychological forces render them rhetorically ineffectual
32. See infra Part I.A.
33. Cf. CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 8-9 (1978) (contrasting deontology
and consequentialism in the realm of morality); SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, THE
REJECTION OF CONSEQUENTIALISM 1-3 (rev. ed. 1994) (same); Robert G. Olson,
Deontological Ethics, in 2 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 343, 343 (Paul
Edwards ed., 1967) (“A deontological theory of ethics is one which holds that at
least some acts are morally obligatory regardless of their consequences for
human weal or woe.”).
34. See infra Part I.B.
35. See infra Part I.C.
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when raised in response to a spirited anti-retention
campaign launched by morally outraged voters. I conclude
that if we are troubled by the direction in which the 2010
elections point, then either we should abandon judicial
retention elections altogether and limit appointed state
judges to single terms, or those judges and their defenders
should set aside their historic reluctance to engage citizens
in civil discourse about controversial rulings and their legal
and moral underpinnings.
I. DEFENDING TARGETED JUDGES: RHETORICAL STRATEGIES
Looking back on the 2010 elections and on the handful
of prior occasions when controversial rulings provoked
angry voters and special-interest groups to launch
organized anti-retention campaigns, a pattern has plainly
emerged. While targeted judges‟ critics focus relentlessly on
the rulings to which they object, the judges and their
supporters generally refuse to engage in a debate about the
merits of those rulings. Instead, judges and their advocates
rely primarily upon a set of deontological and
consequentialist arguments aimed at securing judicial
independence.
A. The Aversion to Debating Controversial Cases‟ Merits
Prior to 2002, candidates in judicial elections of all
kinds were professionally obliged in most states to avoid
talking publicly about certain kinds of controversial issues.
Canon 7B of the American Bar Association‟s (“ABA‟s”) 1972
Model Code of Judicial Conduct stated that a candidate for
judicial office “should not . . . announce his views on
disputed legal or political issues . . . .”36 Most states adopted
some version of that text over the ensuing decade and a
half.37 Critics (including a number of courts) concluded,
however, that Canon 7B unconstitutionally restricted
36. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B(1)(c) (1972). The 1972
Model Code was not the ABA‟s first attempt to persuade states to regulate
judges and judicial candidates in particular ways. See Republican Party of
Minn. v. White (White I), 536 U.S. 765, 786 (2002) (“The first code regulating
judicial conduct was adopted by the ABA in 1924.”).
37. Adam R. Long, Note, Keeping Mud Off the Bench: The First Amendment
and Regulation of Candidates‟ False or Misleading Statements in Judicial
Elections, 51 DUKE L.J. 787, 796 (2001).
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candidates‟ freedom to speak.38 In 1990, the ABA responded
by narrowing the scope of the restriction, stating that
judicial candidates “shall not . . . make statements that
commit or appear to commit the candidate with respect to
cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come before
the court . . . .”39 A number of states adopted the 1990 text,
while others retained the older version.40 To varying
degrees, candidates in all of those states were thus obliged
to steer clear of discussing many controversial issues when
campaigning to win or retain seats on the bench.
Candidates built their campaigns instead on claims about
their qualifications and their overarching commitment to
fairness, honesty, impartiality, and other relevant values.41
In its 2002 ruling in Republican Party of Minnesota v.
White (White I),42 the United States Supreme Court cast new
light on judicial candidates‟ freedom to speak during
election campaigns. At issue in that case was a provision of
the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct that had been

38. See id. at 796-97 (noting that numerous state and federal courts held that
Canon 7B was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad); see, e.g., Buckley v. Ill.
Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 228-29 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding the rule
grossly overinclusive); ACLU of Fla., Inc. v. Fla. Bar, 744 F. Supp. 1094, 1099
(N.D. Fla. 1990) (holding that the Florida Bar had failed to show that the rule
was “the least restrictive means for protecting a compelling state interest”). See
generally U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech . . . .”).
39. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT § 5A(3)(d)(ii) (1990). Although
stylistically different, that provision remains substantively unchanged in the
2007 Model Code. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.1(A)(13) (2007)
(“[A] judicial candidate shall not . . . in connection with cases, controversies, or
issues that are likely to come before the court, make pledges, promises, or
commitments that are inconsistent with the impartial performance of the
adjudicative duties of judicial office.”).
40. See Long, supra note 37, at 797. Four states (Idaho, Michigan, North
Carolina, and Oregon) declined to adopt either version of the relevant speech
restriction, while one state (Alabama) narrowly limited the restriction to issues
raised in pending litigation. See White I, 536 U.S. 765, 786 & nn.13-14 (2002).
41. See Abbe & Herrnson, supra note 15, at 291-92, 295 (presenting the
results of a statistical study of judicial candidates‟ campaign messages).
42. 536 U.S. 765 (2002). On remand, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit also struck down the “partisan activities and solicitation
clauses” of the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct. Republican Party of Minn.
v. White (White II), 416 F.3d 738, 766 (8th Cir. 2005).
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modeled on Canon 7B of the 1972 Model Code. 43 Applying
strict scrutiny,44 the Court accepted for the sake of
argument that Minnesota had a compelling interest in
seating judges who were “open-minded”—judges, that is,
who were “willing to consider views that oppose [their]
preconceptions, and remain open to persuasion, when the
issues arise in a pending case.”45 But the Court rejected the
proposition that Minnesota‟s lawmakers had that objective
in mind when they restricted judicial candidates‟ ability to
speak about controversial legal and political issues.46 As
proof that seating open-minded judges was not the state‟s
actual objective, the Court said that the restriction was
“woefully underinclusive”—the state had made no effort to
bar people from running for judicial office if they had stated
their views on controversial matters prior to launching their
campaigns, and it had made no effort to restrict judges from
stating their views after they had been elected (so long as no
pertinent case was pending before them).47
Having thus declared the provision unconstitutional,48
the Court concluded by observing that there was an
“obvious tension” between Minnesota‟s longstanding
commitment to filling judicial vacancies with contested
elections and its attempt to bar judicial candidates from
talking about “most subjects of interest to the voters.”49 The
Court stated:
[T]he First Amendment does not permit [the state] to achieve its
goal by leaving the principle of elections in place while preventing
candidates from discussing what the elections are about. “The
greater power to dispense with elections altogether does not
include the lesser power to conduct elections under conditions of
state-imposed voter ignorance. If the State chooses to tap the
energy and the legitimizing power of the democratic process, it
43. White I, 537 U.S. at 768. Minnesota was still relying upon the 1972
version of the Model Code. Id.; see also Shepherd, supra note 30, at 644-45
(noting that, by 2002, only nine states retained the 1972 version of Canon 7B).
44. White I, 536 U.S. at 774-75 (noting that the parties and the court below
all agreed that strict scrutiny was appropriate).
45. Id. at 778.
46. Id. at 779.
47. See id. at 779-81.
48. Id. at 788 (announcing the Court‟s holding).
49. Id. at 787.
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must accord the participants in that process . . . the First
50
Amendment rights that attach to their roles.”

While acknowledging that judicial candidates’ freedom to
speak is not necessarily as broad as the freedom enjoyed by
candidates seeking seats in states’ legislative bodies,51 the
Court said that the differences between judicial and legislative elections should not be exaggerated.52 State judges do
“make” law, the Court reasoned—both by shaping the common law and by wielding “the immense power to shape the
States’ constitutions”—and so the core First Amendment
values that are in play in legislative elections are in play in
judicial elections, as well.53
When critics attack sitting judges‟ records during
election campaigns, Republican Party of Minnesota v. White
thus gives those judges a powerful First Amendment
argument that they are free to speak in defense of their
controversial
rulings.
Indeed,
setting
aside
the
unconstitutional restrictions that 1972‟s Canon 7B had
imposed, the successive iterations of the ABA‟s Model Code
have made it increasingly clear that sitting judges possess
precisely that freedom. With respect to retention elections
in particular, for example, the 1972 Model Code stated that
“[a]n incumbent judge who is a candidate for retention . . .
and whose candidacy has drawn active opposition, may
campaign in response thereto . . . .”54 The 1990 Model Code
put an even finer point on the matter, stating that a
50. Id. at 788 (quoting Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 349 (1991) (Marshall,
J., dissenting)).
51. See id. at 783 (“[W]e neither assert nor imply that the First Amendment
requires campaigns for judicial office to sound the same as those for legislative
office.”).
52. Id. at 784.
53. Id. Writing for four dissenters, Justice Ginsburg took a different view:
Judges . . . are not political actors. They do not sit as
representatives of particular persons, communities, or parties; they
serve no faction or constituency. . . .
Thus, the rationale underlying unconstrained speech in
elections for political office—that representative government
depends on the public‟s ability to choose agents who will act at its
behest—does not carry over to campaigns for the bench.
Id. at 806 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
54. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B(3) (1972).
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candidate in any kind of judicial election “may respond to
personal attacks or attacks on the candidate‟s record,”55 so
long as he or she is truthful and does not make any
statements that are inconsistent with his or her duty to be
impartial in future cases.56 The drafters of the 2007 Model
Code elaborated on the point still further in their official
comments, explaining that a judicial candidate‟s opponents
might make “false or misleading statements . . . regarding
the . . . judicial rulings of a candidate,” and that in such a
case, “the candidate may make a factually accurate public
response.”57
Despite those constitutional and professional freedoms,
a culture nevertheless still widely prevails in which judicial
candidates feel they should avoid talking in detail about
their controversial rulings. That culture is surely the
product of numerous influences. When a judge has already
explained her reasoning in a written opinion, for example,
she might feel reluctant to say anything further on the
matter, fearing that she would create confusion if her
remarks were construed as adding a new gloss to her
written account.58 Moreover, in merit-selection and
retention-election states in particular, judges and bar
leaders have staked themselves firmly to the virtues of
judicial independence.59 For these leaders, engaging in a
merits-based defense of controversial rulings might seem
implicitly to concede that one‟s agreement or disagreement
with those rulings should play a role in determining how
one should vote when the judges who wrote or joined those
rulings stand for retention. In some instances, judges‟
reluctance to defend their controversial decisions is likely a
55. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT § 5(A)(3)(e) (1990).
56. Id. § 5(A)(3)(d).
57. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt. 8 (2007).
58. I am grateful to Justice Linda Neuman, formerly of the Iowa Supreme
Court, for sharing this observation with me.
59. See infra notes 107-16, 123-31 and accompanying text (noting the ABA‟s
strong endorsement of the virtues of judicial independence); see also MODEL
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4 (2007) (“A judge or candidate for judicial
office shall not engage in political or campaign activity that is inconsistent with
the independence, integrity, or impartiality of the judiciary.”); MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT § 5(A)(3)(a) (1990) (“A candidate for a judicial office shall
maintain the dignity appropriate to judicial office and act in a manner
consistent with the integrity and independence of the judiciary . . . .”).
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function of their desire not to risk saying anything that
might be construed as unethical.60 In other instances,
judges‟ reticence might be a function of skepticism about
laypeople‟s ability to understand complex legal matters.61
Whatever the reasons, judges who have angered voters
typically run pro-retention campaigns that largely ignore
their controversial rulings and that focus instead on the
themes of judicial independence, fairness, and impartiality.
Consider, for example, the 2010 elections in Iowa, when
Chief Justice Marsha Ternus, Justice Michael Streit, and
Justice David Baker all faced opposition for joining the Iowa
Supreme Court‟s unanimous ruling in Varnum v. Brien,
holding that Iowa‟s ban on same-sex marriage violated the
Iowa Constitution.62 While the justices‟ critics focused
60. See JAMES J. ALFINI ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS § 11.09, at 1128 (4th ed. 2007) (stating that the general thrust of many ethics rulings across
the country “is that anything that could be interpreted as a pledge that the
candidate will take a particular approach in deciding cases or a particular class
of cases is prohibited”). Some enforcement authorities have taken aggressive
positions against permitting judicial candidates to explain their past decisions.
In the early 1980s, for example, the Alabama Judicial Inquiry Commission took
the position that a sitting judge campaigning to keep his seat “should refrain
from commenting on specific cases in which he has participated, especially
where such comment could compromise the validity of any ruling or order
entered by him in such cases.” Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm‟n Op. 82-156 (1982),
available at http://www.alalinc.net/jic/opinions/ao82-140thru157.HTM; see also
Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm‟n Op. 80-85 (1980),
available at
http://www.alalinc.net/jic/opinions/ao80-85&86.HTM (same); ALFINI, supra, §
11.09, at 11-31 (discussing the decisions of the Alabama Judicial Inquiry
Commission). In instances in which there is no risk that an explanation would
“compromise the validity” of past rulings or orders, this anti-speech position is
not dictated by the express language of the 1972, 1990, or 2007 Model Codes, see
supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text, and it plainly is in tension with
judicial candidates‟ First Amendment freedoms under Republican Party of
Minnesota v. White. See supra notes 42-53 and accompanying text.
61. See infra notes 292-94 and accompanying text (discussing such
skepticism).
62. 763 N.W.2d 862, 872 (2009) (“[W]e hold the Iowa marriage statute
violates the equal protection clause of the Iowa Constitution.”); see also IOWA
CONST. art. I, § 6 (“All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation;
the general assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens,
privileges or immunities, which, upon the same terms shall not equally belong
to all citizens.”); IOWA CODE § 595.2(1) (2009) (“Only a marriage between a male
and a female is valid.”), superseded by Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 907. For a
discussion of the campaign against the three justices, see Pettys, supra note 7,
at 722-36.
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relentlessly on the issue of same-sex marriage—accusing
the justices of being “activist[s]” whose “radical” ruling
“imposed gay marriage” on an unwilling public63—the
justices and their leading defenders said hardly a word
about Varnum. Indeed, the three justices themselves
generally refused to say anything at all on their own
behalf.64 The organized groups that emerged to defend them
focused almost entirely on the theme of judicial
independence, arguing that Iowans should not use retention
elections as an opportunity to oust judges in response to
controversial rulings. True to its name, for example, Iowans
for Fair and Impartial Courts focused on its core message
that “Iowa‟s merit selection and retention process are [sic]
key to maintaining [Iowa‟s] fair and impartial courts.”65 A
nonpartisan coalition called Justice, Not Politics similarly
argued that “Iowa‟s merit selection and retention process
keeps politics and campaign money out of our courts,
safeguarding its fairness and impartiality.”66 Fair Courts for
Us urged Iowans to keep the state‟s judiciary “independent,”
“fair,” and “non-partisan” by voting to retain the justices.67
None of these organizations presented a detailed defense of
Varnum. On the issue of same-sex marriage and its status
63. Nation for Marriage, NOM: Iowans for Freedom Against Radical Judges:
David A. Baker, Michael J. Streit, Marsha Ternus, YOUTUBE (Oct. 19, 2010),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MIFnBBLX_OE (television advertisement
sponsored by Iowa for Freedom, the National Organization for Marriage, and
the Campaign for Working Families).
64. Chief Justice Ternus broke the three justices‟ near-silence just a few days
before the election, and even then she focused on the dangers of using a
“retention election as a referendum on a particular court decision,” rather than
on defending Varnum itself. Matt Milner, Targeted Chief Justice Speaks Out,
OTTUMWA
COURIER,
Oct.
26,
2010,
http://ottumwacourier.com/local/
x1872731036/Targeted-chief-justice-speaks-out (noting Chief Justice Ternus‟s
public remarks approximately one week before the election and reporting that
“Ternus and the other justices have said they will not engage in a campaign to
retain their seats and they are not raising money to fund such a campaign”).
65. See IOWANS FOR FAIR & IMPARTIAL COURTS, http://www.learniowa
courts.org (last visited Nov. 12, 2011).
66. About, JUSTICENOTPOLITICS.ORG, http://www.justicenotpolitics.org/about
(last visited Nov. 12, 2011); see also Coalition Opposes Politicizing Judiciary,
DES MOINES REG., Sept. 28, 2010, at 2B (identifying preserving Iowa‟s meritselection process as the goal of Justice, Not Politics).
67. Pettys, supra note 7, at 731 & n.102 (citing webpage that is no longer
available).
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under the Iowa Constitution, the justices and their leading
defenders left the court‟s written opinion in Varnum to fend
for itself.
One could see the same difference in focal points in
individual Iowans‟ letters to their local newspapers. One
study found that while more than 85% of the anti-retention
letter-writers condemned Varnum in one manner or
another, approximately 75% of the pro-retention letterwriters declined to defend Varnum at all, choosing instead
to urge retention on other grounds.68 Taken as a whole, the
pro-retention camp implicitly told voters that they ought to
choose the lesser of two evils: it is better to retain justices
who occasionally rule in ways we find objectionable than to
oust justices for those occasional objectionable rulings.
Indeed, a radio advertisement sponsored by Fair Courts for
Us conveyed that message explicitly, comparing the three
justices to good referees who had forgivably made one
“questionable call.”69
The 2010 elections followed a similar pattern in other
states. In Alaska,70 for example, Justice Fabe‟s supporters
focused on her proclaimed commitment to “fair and
impartial justice.”71 In Florida,72 the supporters of Justices
Labarga and Perry argued that the anti-retention campaign
was a threat to Florida‟s “independent judiciary” and “a
gross abuse of the merit-retention process, which . . . [was]
never intended to be a political referendum based on a

68. See Tyler J. Buller, Framing the Debate: Understanding Iowa‟s 2010
Judicial Retention Election Through a Content Analysis of Letters to the Editor,
97 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming July 2012) (manuscript at 19-21), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1793313.
69. See Grant Schulte, Pro-Retention Ad: Vote „Yes, Yes, and Yes‟ to the
Justices, DESMOINESREGISTER.COM (Oct. 15, 2010), http://blogs.desmoines
register.com/dmr/index.php/2010/10/15/ (containing both the audio and the text
of the advertisement).
70. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (noting the 2010 campaign
against Justice Fabe).
71. Alaskans for Justice Dana Fabe, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/
pages/Alaskans-for-Justice-Dana-Fabe/159399637424701 (last visited June 20,
2011) (webpage no longer available).
72. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (noting the 2010 campaign
against Justices Labarga and Perry).
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single opinion.”73 In Kansas,74 Justice Beier‟s supporters
decried the “unprecedented attack on the independence of
the Kansas judicial system” and urged voters to remain
“committed to a fair and impartial judiciary.”75
This campaign strategy traces its roots back many
years. Consider, for example, the 1986 elections in
California, when (as in Iowa in 2010) three justices on a
single state supreme court were ousted in one fell swoop.76
When they went to the ballot box that year, California
voters removed Chief Justice Rose Bird, Justice Cruz
Reynoso, and Justice Joseph Grodin from the California
Supreme Court for repeatedly voting to overturn death
sentences.77 Anti-retention forces ran a heated campaign
against the three justices, accusing them of favoring killers
73. Anthony Man, Republicans, Tea Party Trying to Oust Supreme Court
Justice from Palm Beach County, SUNSENTINEL.COM (Oct. 29, 2010, 8:55 AM),
http://weblogs.sunsentinel.com/news/politics/palm/blog/2010/10/republicans_tea_
party_trying_t.html (quoting a statement issued by a group called Floridians for
an Independent Judiciary).
74. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (noting the 2010 campaign
against Justice Beier).
75. Mission,
JUSTICE
FOR
KANSAS,
INC.,
http://www.justicefor
kansasinc.com/about-2 (last visited Nov. 12, 2011); see also Roxana Hegeman,
Kansas Voters Keep Justices, TOPEKA CAP.-J., Nov. 3, 2010, at 2A (“Kansas for
Life‟s [anti-retention campaign against Justice Beier] had prompted a group of
lawyers calling themselves Justice for Kansas to launch a counter-campaign to
assure the „independence of the judiciary.‟”).
76. See Schotland, supra note 8, at 118.
77. See Frank Clifford, Voters Repudiate 3 of Court‟s Liberal Justices, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 5, 1986, at A1 (reporting the ouster of the three justices and stating
that Chief Justice Bird had voted to overturn all of the sixty-one death
sentences that came before her for review, that Justice Reynoso had voted to
overturn forty-six of the forty-seven death sentences that came before him for
review, and that Justice Grodin had voted to overturn forty of the forty-five
death sentences that came before him for review). Most of the anti-retention
activity was focused on Chief Justice Bird. Justices Reynoso and Grodin were
then swept up in the tide. See id.; see also Lorie Hearn, Grodin Blames Link to
Bird for Ouster, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Nov. 13, 1986, at A3. Chief Justice Bird
was unpopular for additional reasons. See Robert S. Thompson, Judicial
Retention Elections and Judicial Method: A Retrospective on the California
Retention Election of 1986, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 2007, 2022-32 (1988) (stating that
Chief Justice Bird was “secretive and withdrawn,” that she often seemed
uncomfortable in social situations, and that she seemed to plainly favor the
Democratic Party in her decisions).
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over victims and their families.78 Rather than specifically
defend their rulings in those and other cases, the targeted
justices built their campaign primarily on the theme of
judicial independence—the one theme that “polling
indicated . . . would not work.”79 To the extent that the
justices and their champions did defend the court‟s
controversial rulings, they suggested that the law in those
cases had mechanically forced the justices to reach their
conclusions, thereby denying what many voters intuitively
knew to be true—namely, that ideology and judgment do
play roles in the work that judges perform.80
That same general pattern has been repeated in other
states. In 1996, for example, unhappy voters targeted
Justice Penny White, of the Tennessee Supreme Court. 81
Her critics charged that she was unfit to remain in office
because she had voted to vacate a convicted killer‟s death
sentence in State v. Odom,82 a case involving the rape and
murder of an elderly woman.83 Conservative groups and
victims‟ rights organizations launched an anti-retention
campaign, arguing that Justice White was “pro-criminal”
and “anti-death penalty.”84 Due to the likelihood that the
78. See Robert Lindsey, Defeated Justice Fearful of Attacks on Judiciary, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 8, 1986, at A7 (“[M]ost of the most widely broadcast anti-Bird
commercials were emotional appeals by parents and other [relatives] of murder
victims whose killers had escaped execution . . . .”); Thompson, supra note 77, at
2039 (“[I]n a constantly repeated series of television spots, many times
spotlighting relatives of murder victims, [the anti-retention campaign]
graphically depicted the circumstances of the crime, concluding with the
statement that the death penalty imposed upon the defendant had been
reversed.”); John T. Wold & John H. Culver, The Defeat of the California
Justices: The Campaign, the Electorate, and the Issue of Judicial Accountability,
70 JUDICATURE 348, 348 (1987) (reproducing the text and images of a few antiretention advertisements).
79. Wold & Culver, supra note 78, at 350.
80. See Thompson, supra note 77, at 2038-39. For a discussion of popular
perceptions of the adjudicative process, see infra notes 100-02 and
accompanying text.
81. See Traciel V. Reid, The Politicization of Retention Elections: Lessons from
the Defeat of Justices Lanphier and White, 83 JUDICATURE 68, 70 (1999)
(describing the origins of the anti-retention campaign against Justice White).
82. 928 S.W.2d 18 (Tenn. 1996).
83. Id. at 21-22; see Reid, supra note 81, at 70.
84. Reid, supra note 81, at 70.
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Odom case would return to the Tennessee Supreme Court
on a subsequent appeal, Justice White (quite
understandably) refused to discuss the controversial ruling
during her campaign.85 Instead, she argued as a general
matter that she was not “soft” on crime, tried to discredit
some of the groups leading the charge to oust her, and
stressed the “ideal of judicial independence.”86 Ultimately,
Justice White lost her bid to remain on the court, receiving
only 45% of the vote.87
The same year that voters ousted Justice White from
her seat on the Tennessee Supreme Court, voters in
Nebraska removed Justice David Lanphier from that state‟s
high court.88 Justice Lanphier‟s critics accused him of
disregarding the will of ordinary Nebraskans by joining a
ruling striking down a state constitutional amendment that
had imposed term limits on state and federal officers, and
by joining a series of rulings narrowing the scope of the
state‟s definition of second-degree murder.89 Explaining that
he wanted “to maintain the dignity of the office,” Justice
Lanphier refused to campaign on his own behalf or to
defend his past rulings, other than to point out during lastminute press interviews that the state‟s prison population
had increased during his time in office.90 Instead, he relied
on Nebraska voters to embrace the virtues of judicial
independence.91 On Election Day, ballots cast by his
opponents outnumbered those of his supporters by roughly
a two-to-one margin.92
The point should not be overstated—targeted justices do
sometimes defend their records, albeit at a fairly high level
of abstraction. In the 2010 elections in Illinois,93 for
85. Id. at 71, 73-74.
86. Id. at 72.
87. See id. at 71-72.
88. Id. at 68.
89. Id. at 70.
90. Id. at 72.
91. See id.
92. See Leslie Boellstorff, Lanphier Loses Seat on Supreme Court, OMAHA
WORLD-HERALD, Nov. 6, 1996, at A1.
93. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (noting the 2010 campaign
against Chief Justice Kilbride).
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example,
Chief
Justice
Kilbride
ran
television
advertisements trumpeting his toughness on crime.94 Yet
refusing to defend controversial rulings remains the widely
prevailing norm.
The oft-repeated argument for judicial independence
entails a number of sub-arguments, some of which are
deontological in nature and some of which are
consequentialist. I briefly recount those arguments here
before proceeding in Parts II and III to critique them.
B. Deontological Arguments
When put in colloquial terms, deontological95 proretention arguments can be reduced to the proposition that,
wholly apart from concerns about consequences, judges
should not be fired for simply doing their jobs. When one
votes to oust a judge because one finds some of his or her
rulings objectionable, the argument here goes, one
manifests a failure to understand the rule of law and the
accompanying distinction between law and politics. A
citizen who understands these precepts will recognize, on
this view, that retention elections are a categorically
inappropriate forum for expressing one‟s policy preferences
or one‟s personal views about how the law should be
interpreted and applied in individual cases. Although he
focused primarily on consequentialist concerns, Charles
Geyh appeared to advance this line of argument in his
article, Why Judicial Elections Stink: “[T]he premise
underlying campaigns to defeat judges who make rulings
with which voters disagree—namely, that judges are
supposed to make decisions agreeable to their
„constituents‟—contributes to the [mistaken] view that the
judiciary is as „political‟ a branch of government as the other
two . . . .”96
94. See, e.g., FairCourtsPage, Justice Thomas Kilbride Defends Himself From
Attack Ads, YOUTUBE (Oct. 21, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=DonT0iTg4mE; FairCourtsPage, Justice Thomas Kilbride Tough on Crime
(Illinois
2010),
YOUTUBE
(Oct.
8,
2010),
http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=eTOUgFXgqS8&NR=1.
95. See supra
“deontological”).

note

33

and accompanying text (defining the

term

96. Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 43,
51-52 (2003).
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Many others have made comparable claims. During the
2010 elections in Iowa, for example, roughly a third of
citizens who wrote letters to their local newspapers in
defense of the three targeted justices argued that judges are
obliged to interpret the state constitution without regard to
the interpretation‟s political popularity, and that the
members of the Iowa Supreme Court thus were simply
doing their jobs when they struck down the state‟s ban on
same-sex marriage.97 One letter-writer put it this way:
The court interpreted law, within the parameters of our state‟s
Constitution. And in so doing, [it] unanimously stated that the
law restricting marriage to a man and a woman was
unconstitutional.
...
The Iowa Supreme Court was doing its job, interpreting law even
when it may be unpopular.
Let‟s keep all seven of them on the bench.

98

Another writer similarly argued:
The retention concept is a protection from those judges who might
be incompetent, who might fail to give due diligence in reviewing
cases, who might be proven to have received bribes to influence a
vote. The concept was not intended as a reprimand for failure to
interpret the constitution as demanded by any religious ideology
or business interest. A vote against retention of a specific person
based on self-interest or on individual belief is a vote against the
99
judicial system.

In drawing a connection between disregard for the lawpolitics distinction and opposition to judges who have
participated in controversial rulings, deontological
arguments might be construed in either of two ways. They
sometimes might be construed as claiming that the targeted
97. See Buller, supra note 68, manuscript at 20-21.
98. Rob Potts, Letter to the Editor, Justices Did Not “Make Law;” They
Interpreted
It,
OTTUMWA
COURIER
ONLINE
(Oct.
22,
2010),
http://ottumwacourier.com/letters/x693285242/Justices-did-not-make-law-theyinterpreted-it.
99. Alan L. Egly, Letter to the Editor, Don‟t Vote Against Judge Based on
Self-Interest,
Ideology,
QUAD-CITIES
ONLINE
(Oct.
27,
2010),
http://www.qconline.com/archives/qco/display.php?id=516205.
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judges were mechanically applying the objective dictates of
the law when they ruled as they did in controversial cases,
such that it is senseless to blame the judges themselves for
those cases‟ outcomes. Some Americans do hold the view
that the law typically provides objectively correct answers
to which all reasonable judges are ineluctably drawn,100 and
prominent jurists do sometimes speak of adjudication as if it
involved nothing more than the objective application of
determinate rules.101 Many Americans recognize, however,
that adjudication frequently demands the exercise of
judicial discretion because legal texts and principles are
often less than fully determinate.102
100. See James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Has Legal Realism Damaged
the Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court?, 45 LAW & SOC‟Y REV. 195, 207 (2011)
(finding that some Americans believe in “mechanical jurisprudence,” but that
this belief is not particularly widespread); John M. Scheb II & William Lyons,
The Myth of Legality and Public Evaluation of the Supreme Court, 81 SOC. SCI.
Q. 928, 929 (2000) (“The myth of legality holds that cases are decided by the
application of legal rules formulated and applied through a politically and
philosophically neutral process of legal reasoning. . . . [T]he myth of legality is
deeply ingrained in American culture.”).
101. See, e.g., Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr.
to be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr., Nominee to
be Chief Justice of the United States) (“Judges are like umpires. Umpires don‟t
make the rules, they apply them. The role of an umpire and a judge is critical.
They make sure everybody plays by the rules, but it is a limited role.”); Geyh,
supra note 96, at 72 (“[O]ur state and national governments . . . depend[] on
[their] courts to ensure that the executive and legislative branches and the
temporary majorities they represent conform their conduct to the dictates of the
Constitution . . . .” (emphasis added)). See generally Jack Ladinsky & Allan
Silver, Popular Democracy and Judicial Independence: Electorate and Elite
Reactions to Two Wisconsin Supreme Court Elections, 1967 WIS. L. REV. 128, 168
(“The traditional, conservative, and elitist interpretation of judicial power,
stressing its majesty, aloofness, and neutrality, developed, we suspect, as a
reactive defense against a population more „populist‟ and interventionist in the
past than it is now.”); Theodore A. McKee, Judges as Umpires, 35 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1709, 1710 (2007) (“[T]he [umpire] metaphor has become accepted as a
kind of shorthand for judicial „best practices‟ . . . .”); Todd E. Pettys, Judicial
Discretion in Constitutional Cases, 26 J.L. & POL. 123, 132-43 (2011) (discussing
the prevalence of formalistic rhetoric during Supreme Court confirmation
hearings).
102. See Carrington & Long, supra note 26, at 469 (“Although there was a time
. . . when many American lawyers and some citizens deluded themselves with
the belief that judges could be trained to be professional technicians
interpreting statutes and constitutions without regard to their political
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For many of those who take this latter view, judges
remain importantly distinct from members of the state and
federal governments‟ political branches by virtue of the
perception that judges exercise their discretion “in a
principled, rather than strategic, way.”103 That is, when
making their discretionary decisions, judges limit
themselves to a narrower set of reasons than is available in
the realm of ordinary electoral politics—they base their
decisions only upon “reasons provided by the law, and not
on reasons excluded by judicial duty or the law‟s
standards.”104 Judges “are not merely politicians in robes,”105
therefore, but rather are constrained (yet discretionexercising) stewards of the law. In their more sophisticated
forms, deontological pro-retention arguments thus may be
understood as positing that the rule of law in America
necessarily entails relying upon judges to make principled
discretionary decisions on legal matters about which
reasonable judges might disagree, and that citizens thus fail
to understand the rule of law when they contend that mere
consequences, there is virtually no one who thinks that today.” (footnote
omitted)); Gibson & Caldeira, supra note 100, at 207-08 (making a comparable
point using empirical analysis); see also infra Part II.A (elaborating on this
point). See generally BRIAN BIX, JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT 179 (4th
ed. 2006) (noting Legal Realists‟ rejection nearly a century ago of the mechanical
notion that legal conclusions “followed simply and inexorably from undeniable
premises”).
103. Gibson & Calderia, supra note 100, at 213. Another marker of the lawpolitics distinction on this view is judges‟ obligation to explain their decisions in
ways that are not expected of politicians. See Kent Greenfield, Law, Politics,
and the Erosion of Legitimacy in the Delaware Courts, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
481, 485 (2010/2011) (“[T]he most important judicial constraint is the
requirement of explanation—the practice of courts to write out reasons for their
judgments.”); Chad M. Oldfather, Defining Judicial Inactivism: Models of
Adjudication and the Duty to Decide, 94 GEO. L.J. 121, 156 (2005) (“[T]he
judiciary‟s legitimacy and authority depend largely on its ability to persuasively
explain and justify its decisions.”); Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and
the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1372 (1995)
(“One of the few ways we [judges] have to justify our power to decide matters
important to our fellow citizens is to explain why we decide as we do.”). For
elaboration upon the law-politics distinction, see Pettys, supra note 101, at 16972.
104. Pettys, supra note 101, at 170 (quoting STEVEN J. BURTON, JUDGING
GOOD FAITH 92 (1992)).
105. Gibson & Caldeira, supra note 100, at 214.
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disagreement with judges‟ rulings is an adequate reason to
remove those judges from office.106
C. Consequentialist Arguments
Concerns about the rule of law also loom large in the
cluster of consequentialist arguments that pro-retention
forces advance when judges are targeted for ouster in
response to controversial rulings. Numerous prominent
jurists have warned that using retention elections as an
opportunity to express disapproval of judges‟ decisions poses
dire threats to states‟ judicial systems. In 1998, for example,
the ABA‟s Task Force on Lawyers‟ Political Contributions
declared: “Never is there more potential for judicial
accountability being distorted and judicial independence
being jeopardized than when a judge is campaigned against
because of a stand on a single issue or even in a single
case.”107 The ABA‟s Commission on the Twenty-First
106. This appears, for example, to be Michael Shapiro‟s argument. Shapiro
readily acknowledges “the difficulties in clearly distinguishing judging from
politics.” Michael H. Shapiro, Introduction: Judicial Selection and the Design of
Clumsy Institutions, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1555, 1559 (1988). He nevertheless
opposes judicial elections as a general matter:
The promotion of the democratic value in judicial elections challenges
the rule of law value in a particularly vivid and therefore dangerous
way. To say that something is a matter for popular election—where by
design there is no way to assure the use of rational decision criteria—is
to suggest that it is not a matter governed primarily by binding
principles. To say that public officials of certain kinds should be elected
suggests that what they do is not dominated by principled
decisionmaking. To say that judges should be elected or subject to
retention elections after appointment suggests that what they do is
similar in many respects to what legislators and executives do, and that
they may be chosen on the same bases.
Even if the ideal of the rule of law is overrated, it doesn‟t deserve
this injury.
Id. at 1562-63 (footnote omitted).
107. TASK FORCE ON LAWYERS‟ POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS, supra note 18, at 6;
accord Charles Gardner Geyh, The Endless Judicial Selection Debate and Why
It Matters for Judicial Independence, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1259, 1276 (2008)
(“[T]he primary threat to [judicial] independence arises at the point of reselection, when judges are put at risk of losing their jobs for unpopular decisions
that they previously made.”); see also id. at 1259 (“It is thought that if judges
are independent—if they are insulated from political and other controls that
could undermine their impartial judgment—they will be better able to uphold
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Century Judiciary issued a comparable warning in 2003,
arguing that when judges are targeted for ouster in
response to their rulings on specific issues, it sends a
“message [that] is antithetical to principles of judicial
independence, impartiality, and the rule of law.”108 Chief
Justice Paul De Muniz of the Oregon Supreme Court has
written that “[n]othing can be more damaging to a society
based on the rule of law than if judges fear that they will be
removed from office or that their livelihood will be impacted
solely for making a decision that is right legally and
factually but unpopular politically.”109
Proponents of consequentialist arguments contend that
there are several ways in which the rule of law is
threatened when voters deny retention to judges who have
written or joined controversial rulings.110 First, Election Day
ousters send other judges the message that they need to
engage in significant—and problematic—fundraising if they
want to maximize their ability to fend off any challenges
that might materialize in their own retention bids further
down the road. To build campaign war chests, judges must
develop relationships with donors—relationships that, in
turn, create the reality or perception of bias and conflicts of
interest when those judges adjudicate cases that bear upon
their
contributors‟
concerns.111
Empirical
research
the rule of law, preserve the separation of powers, and promote due process of
law.”).
108. COMM‟N ON THE 21ST CENTURY JUDICIARY, AM. BAR ASS‟N, JUSTICE
JEOPARDY 67 (2003) [hereinafter JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY].

IN

109. De Muniz, supra note 19, at 389.
110. Some consequentialist arguments concern matters other than the rule of
law. Some critics of anti-retention campaigns worry, for example, that
heightened fears about one‟s job security on the bench will discourage good
people from pursuing judgeships. See, e.g., Schotland, supra note 8, at 127-28.
111. See STANDING COMM. ON JUDICIAL INDEP., AM. BAR ASS‟N, REPORT OF THE
COMM‟N ON PUBLIC FINANCING OF JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS 1, 4 (2002) (stating that
the need to raise money for judicial elections sits in tension with judges‟
obligation to uphold the rule of law by applying the law impartially, without
regard to their rulings‟ popularity or affect on powerful people); Ming W. Chin,
Judicial Independence: Under Attack Again?, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 1345, 1348
(2010) (“When judges have to rely on campaign donors to get or keep their jobs,
there is an inevitable public perception of judicial bias and favoritism. This
perception threatens to diminish the courts‟ effectiveness . . . .”); Lawrence M.
Friedman, Benchmarks: Judges on Trial, Judicial Selection and Election, 58
DEPAUL L. REV. 451, 460 (2009) (“A regime of hotly contested, feverish judicial
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demonstrates that campaign contributions have the same
perceived power to corrupt when directed to judges as when
they are directed to politicians.112 Indeed, the perception of
corruption is especially pernicious for judges, whose
impartiality is an indispensable component of any system
that purports to honor the rule of law.113
Second, when voters demonstrate their willingness to
deny retention to judges who have participated in
controversial rulings, they increase the risk that judges will
decide cases based upon anticipated electoral consequences
rather than upon what the judges believe is the thrust of
the law.114 Lawrence Friedman makes this point when he
argues that “[a] regime of hotly contested, feverish judicial
elections is dangerous . . . [because of the risk] that judges,
facing or fearing opposition, will shy away from decisions
that might make trouble at the polls.”115 A significant body
elections . . . [forces] judges . . . to campaign, but campaigning costs money and
money corrupts.”); Reid, supra note 81, at 77 (“[T]he integrity of the courts and
public confidence in them are threatened by the mere perception that judicial
decisions might be influenced by interest group politics and campaign
contributions.”).
112. See James L. Gibson, Challenges to the Impartiality of State Supreme
Courts: Legitimacy Theory and “New-Style” Judicial Campaigns, 102 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 59, 69 (2008) (reporting, based on empirical research, that campaign
contributions powerfully undermine the perceived impartiality and legitimacy of
judicial candidates and politicians alike).
113. See infra Part II.B.3.b (discussing the rule of law).
114. See JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY, supra note 108, at 72 (observing that, when an
election is looming, judges may feel great pressure to do what is popular). See
generally Republican Party of Minn. v. White (White I), 536 U.S. 765, 798 (2002)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[I]n litigation, issues of law or fact should not be
determined by popular vote; it is the business of judges to be indifferent to
unpopularity.”); De Muniz, supra note 19, at 388 (“Outcome-determinative
criticism [of judges] is corrosive to judicial independence because it implies that
a judge should always reach a particular outcome regardless of the law.”); Reid,
supra note 81, at 77 (“The legitimacy of courts and judges [in the public‟s eye] is
directly tied to ensuring that judicial decisions reflect an objective application of
the law, not whether a court ruling will be supported or opposed by a particular
group or individual.”).
115. Friedman, supra note 111, at 460. The posited link between insulation
from electoral consequences and sound judicial decision-making is not, however,
undisputed. See, e.g., MICHAEL NEUMANN, THE RULE OF LAW: POLITICIZING ETHICS
11 (2002) (“Perhaps [a politically insulated] judiciary is so arrogant in its
independence, or so complacent, or of such poor quality, that a little dependence
would actually improve the quality of its judgments.”).
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of empirical evidence suggests that judges facing upcoming
elections are indeed sometimes influenced by worries about
the political ramifications of their rulings.116
Third, ousting judges for controversial rulings about
constitutional
matters
threatens
the
project
of
constitutionalism itself. Constitutionalism demands that
judges decide cases based upon the sovereign people‟s longterm constitutional commitments, even when those
commitments conflict with the electorate‟s short-term
majoritarian preferences—and the threat of non-retention
makes it harder for judges to disregard those short-term
preferences.117 Many state and federal constitutional texts
are aimed at providing protection for political minorities,
yet those texts provide little protection if judges are
unwilling to issue unpopular constitutional rulings.118
Alexander Hamilton expressed precisely this concern in The
Federalist No. 78 when defending the plan to insulate
federal judges from electoral influences:
This independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the
Constitution and the rights of individuals from the effects of those
ill humors which the arts of designing men, or the influence of
particular conjectures, sometimes disseminate among the people
themselves, and which, though they speedily give place to better
information, and more deliberate reflection, have a tendency, in
the meantime, to occasion dangerous innovations in the

116. See Judges, supra note 19, at 135-36 (citing numerous studies to support
the assertion that appointed and elected judges behave differently); Eric
Sandberg-Zakian, Rethinking “Bias”: Judicial Elections and the Due Process
Clause After Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 64 ARK. L. REV. 179, 199-201
(2011) (citing empirical studies showing that judicial decisions are sometimes
made with the hope of being reelected).
117. See Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries
and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 696-97 (1995) (“[T]o the extent
majoritarian pressures influence judicial decisions because of judges‟ electoral
calculations, elective judiciaries seem, at least at first glance, irreconcilable with
one of the fundamental principles underlying constitutionalism.”).
118. See Pozen, supra note 31, at 2087 (“Choosing judges through elections, it
is often said, poses serious threats to individual and minority rights . . . .”); see
also id. at 2100 (“[T]he specter of lawlessness, of barely concealed favoritism and
presentist populism run amok, looms large over the new era of judicial
elections.”).
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government, and serious oppressions of the minor party in the
119
community.

As
a
matter
of
political
marketing,
these
consequentialist arguments have been grouped for many
years under the banner of “judicial independence.” 120 Yet
there has been a perceptible shift in recent years to
supplement (or even replace) that phrase with the terms
“fair” and “impartial.”121 The problem with the phrase
“judicial independence” has been that, for voters who are
already angered by particular rulings, a plea to preserve
judges‟ independence risks fueling the perception that
judges see themselves as elites who are entitled to supplant
the will of the people with their own conception of the public
good. Traciel Reid illustrates this point in her discussion of
Justice White‟s and Justice Lanphier‟s failed 1996 bids for
retention in Tennessee and Nebraska, respectively:
[B]oth White and Lanphier had to argue in favor of “the ideal of
judicial independence.” Hinging their retention upon the public
acceptance of the value of judicial independence reinforced the
underlying premise of their opponents‟ argument. The antiretention forces contended that justices such as White and
Lanphier were too independent because their decisions were
antithetical to or out-of-step with popular sentiments. When
proponents of White and Lanphier commendably tried to discuss
the importance of an independent judiciary, they unwittingly were
122
bolstering the concerns and criticisms of their opponents.

119. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 468 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 2003).
120. See, e.g., Reid, supra note 81, at 72.
121. See, e.g., supra notes 65-75 and accompanying text (noting the prevalent
use of the terms “fair” and “impartial” during the 2010 elections).
122. Reid, supra note 81, at 72; see also supra notes 81-92 and accompanying
text (noting those two failed bids for retention). Dave Pimentel recently made
the same general observation:
[T]he term “judicial independence” does not always strike the desired
chord. While that phrase resonates within the legal community as
something desirable . . . it may seem less desirable in other circles . . . .
....
. . . [T]o the general public at least, and even to legislators at times, the
words “judicial independence” may smack of the judges‟ self-interest—
shoring up judges‟ power or enhancing their comfort by insulating them
from any consequences for their actions. For those who already view
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By shifting to the terms “fair” and “impartial,” judges and
their champions hope to avoid that trap and to denote more
precisely the societal goods that judicial independence is
meant to achieve.
Consider, for example, the work of the ABA‟s Least
Understood Branch Project (“the Project”)—a joint endeavor
of the ABA‟s Standing Committee on Judicial Independence
and the ABA‟s Judicial Division, with the participation of
the League of Women Voters, Justice at Stake, and the
National Center for State Courts.123 On the ABA‟s website,
the Project has provided what it calls a “Resource Kit on
Fair and Impartial Courts.”124 Visitors to that site can find a
variety of resources for judges and their defenders to use
when judges are targeted for ouster in response to
controversial rulings.125 The Project has written sample
letters to the editor, sample resolutions for state and local
governments, advice for campaign speeches, and other
materials—and the words “fair” and “impartial” permeate
those texts.126 In a guide titled In Support of Fair and
Impartial Courts: Countering the Critics,127 for example,
consultants retained by the Project recount the story of a
judge who spoke to a group of local voters about “the
importance of judicial independence” and was hammered at
the end of his talk by “a battery of complaints and
comments about the courts and judges: their inefficiency,
lack of accountability and mishandling of various hot-button
judges as over-privileged and too powerful, such “judicial independence”
would be at best a low priority, and more likely a problem in need of a
remedy.
Dave Pimentel, Reframing the Independence v. Accountability Debate: Defining
Judicial Structure in Light of Judges‟ Courage and Integrity, 57 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 1, 6-7 (2009).
123. See Resource Kit on Fair and Impartial Courts, AM. BAR ASS‟N,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/justice_center/judicial_independence/resour
ces/resource_kit_on_fair_impartial_courts_lub.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2011)
(describing the Least Understood Branch Project).
124. See id.
125. See id. (providing links to numerous materials).
126. See id.
127. MARGIE ELSBERG, AM. BAR ASS‟N, IN SUPPORT OF FAIR AND IMPARTIAL
COURTS: COUNTERING THE CRITICS (2006), available at http://www.american
bar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/judind/toolkit/impartialcourts/critics.authche
ckdam.pdf (last visited June 25, 2011).
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issues.”128 The Project‟s consultants then provide
approximately twenty pages of advice aimed at helping
speakers engender support for courts that are “as Fair and
Impartial as is humanly possible.”129 When a questioner
wants to argue about a controversial ruling, for example,
the consultants urge the speaker to refuse to enter the
debate and to use the exchange instead as an opportunity to
return to the themes of fairness and impartiality.130 The
consultants advise speakers to repeat those two words and
themes as often as is reasonably possible:
Repetition is a powerful tool so use it—your audience will
remember the words “fair and impartial courts” if you say them
over and over. At the same time, you‟ll want to avoid sounding
like a broken record. So from time to time, you might turn to
sports analogies for help.
∙ “If we all want ballgames to be impartially refereed—when all
that‟s at stake is a banner in the gym or a plaque on the wall—
think how important it is to this democracy that our court
proceedings be fair and impartial.”
∙ “Just as referees must follow the rules of the game, judges are
held accountable to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights—not
to politicians and special interests. Don‟t forget that court
decisions must be published for all to see. And if someone feels
131
the decision wasn‟t fair, they can appeal it to a higher court.”

When invoked to assuage the concerns of angry voters,
these
rhetorical
strategies—deontological
and
consequentialist alike—are fundamentally misguided. I
address the deontological arguments in Part II and the
consequentialist arguments in Part III.
II. DEONTOLOGY AND THE RULE OF LAW
Deontological pro-retention arguments posit that,
wholly apart from anticipated consequences, a citizen who
understands the rule of law and the distinction between law
and politics will recognize that one‟s vote in judicial
retention elections does not provide an appropriate vehicle
128. Id. at 3.
129. Id.; see also id. at 4-19 (providing advice).
130. See id. at 7.
131. Id.
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for declaring one‟s views about public policy or one‟s
disagreement with particular judicial rulings.132 I noted
earlier that such arguments might be construed in either of
two ways. First, one might understand them as claiming
that targeted judges were mechanically applying the
objective dictates of the law when they ruled as they did in
controversial cases.133 Second, one might understand these
arguments as claiming that the rule of law necessarily
entails relying upon judges to make principled discretionary
decisions on matters about which reasonable judges might
disagree.134 I begin by briefly elaborating on the reasons why
arguments of the former variety should generally be
shunned. Turning then to the latter, more nuanced form of
argument, I contend that—consequentialist concerns
aside—voting to oust judges who have participated in
controversial rulings is often entirely consistent with a
commitment to the rule of law.
A. The Mechanical Interpretation of the Deontological
Argument
As I have noted, judges and other prominent members
of the legal establishment frequently use rhetoric
suggesting that the job of a judge is quite mechanical—it is
to ascertain the relevant facts (perhaps with the aid of a
jury), and then to identify the outcome that is objectively
dictated by the law‟s determinate sources.135 We saw this
most famously in Chief Justice John Roberts‟ use of the
umpire metaphor during his confirmation hearings,136 we
frequently see it when political leaders praise or condemn
particular judicial nominees and judicial rulings,137 and we
see it when someone tries to resolve a hotly contested public
policy issue (such as abortion or same-sex marriage) by
132. See supra Part I.B; see also supra note 33 (defining “deontological”).
133. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
136. See supra note 101. See generally Gibson & Caldeira, supra note 100, at
196-97 (noting that judicial nominees routinely—and disingenuously—deny that
they will exercise significant discretion).
137. See Pettys, supra note 101, at 126, 132-43 (discussing remarks made by
senators during Supreme Court confirmation hearings).
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appealing to the “dictates” of the Constitution.138 Such
language has long been part of our public dialogue and
judicial mythology.139 When deployed in conjunction with a
deontological argument against ousting state judges, this
mechanical view of courts‟ work suggests that, when voters
oppose a judge‟s bid for retention because he or she
participated in controversial rulings, those voters fail to
understand that the law gave the judge no choice but to rule
in the way that he or she did. When voters oppose judges
who participated in controversial rulings, in other words,
they are foolishly setting themselves in opposition to the
law itself.
In those areas of the law where one finds sustained
public controversy and where anti-retention campaigns are
thus most likely to find traction, deontological arguments of
this sort are almost always false. There are, of course,
instances in which judges do little more than apply the
plain requirements of the law, as when a case calls for the
application of unambiguous thresholds (like ages and speed
limits) or when a dispute plainly falls within a welldeveloped line of uncontested and homogeneous
precedent.140 These are not the kinds of cases, however, that
typically provoke voters to oppose judges‟ bids for retention.
As the 2010 elections make clear, the rulings that provoke
anti-retention campaigns tend to concern matters like
abortion, same-sex marriage, and the rights of criminal
defendants—matters governed by legal texts whose open138. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
139. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 119, at 464 (arguing that the
judiciary is the “least dangerous” branch because it possesses “neither FORCE
nor WILL but merely judgment”); see also Paul J. Mishkin, The Supreme Court.
1964 Term—Foreword: The High Court, the Great Writ, and the Due Process of
Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56, 62-63 (1965) (“[There] is the strongly held
and deeply felt belief that judges are bound by a body of fixed, overriding law,
that they apply the law impersonally as well as impartially, that they exercise
no individual choice and have no program of their own to advance. . . . If the
view be in part myth, it is a myth by which we live . . . .” (footnote omitted)). For
a discussion of the social purposes that such mythologies serve in the
constitutional realm, see Todd E. Pettys, The Myth of the Written Constitution,
84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 991, 1029-48 (2009).
140. Cf. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM‟S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 11 (1996) (“[M]ost constitutional cases . . . are not hard
cases. The ordinary craft of a judge dictates an answer and leaves no room for
the play of personal moral conviction.”).
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ended wording is reasonably susceptible to competing
interpretations.141 When the relevant legal texts speak at a
high level of abstraction, or when the identification of the
relevant legal texts is itself contested, judges must—by
necessity—exercise interpretive discretion.142 This does not
mean that judges are free to select any outcomes and
rationales that suit their fancy. Rather, it means that in
cases of the sort that are likely to trigger public controversy,
there often are multiple ways “in which a judge who
conscientiously applies the interpretive conventions of the
legal profession could resolve the given dispute.”143
Within the legal profession, the claim that judges
frequently exercise interpretive discretion is hardly
controversial.144 Focusing on constitutional disputes in
particular, James Bradley Thayer observed more than a
century ago that “much which will seem unconstitutional to
one man, or body of men, may reasonably not seem so to
another; that the constitution often admits of different
interpretations; [and] that there is often a range of choice
and judgment.”145 Judge Richard Posner has made the same
point about the law more generally:

141. See supra notes 6-13 and accompanying text.
142. The existence of a large body of precedent does not necessarily reduce or
eliminate the need for interpretive discretion. See Stefanie A. Lindquist &
Frank B. Cross, Empirically Testing Dworkin‟s Chain Novel Theory: Studying
the Path of Precedent, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1156, 1205 (2005) (concluding, based on
empirical analysis, “that judicial discretion appears to expand with the growth
of additional precedents,” presumably because larger bodies of precedent have
more analytic strains from which to choose).
143. Pettys, supra note 101, at 124 & n.3 (defining “discretion” in this way and
citing supporting authorities); see also Steven J. Burton, Particularism,
Discretion, and the Rule of Law, in THE RULE OF LAW 178, 189 (Ian Shapiro ed.,
1994) (“Discretion is the power to choose between two or more courses of action
each of which is thought of as lawful.”).
144. Cf. Gibson & Caldeira, supra note 100, at 196 (“[N]o serious analyst
would today contend that the decisions of the justices of the Supreme Court are
independent of the personal ideologies of the judges. In this sense, legal realism
has carried the day.”).
145. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893); see also id. at 148 (stating
that judges‟ job is to “fix[] the outside border” of interpretive choices that elected
officials can make).
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There is almost always a zone of reasonableness within which a
decision either way can be defended persuasively, or at least
plausibly, using the resources of judicial rhetoric. But the zone
can be narrow or wide—narrow when formalist analysis provides
a satisfactory solution, wide when it does not. Within the zone, a
decision cannot be labeled “right” or “wrong”; truth just is not in
146
the picture.

One of the chief functions of legal education is thus to train
students to develop “a feel for the outer bounds of permissible legal argumentation at the time when the education is
being imparted,”147 recognizing that those outer bounds will
shift over time and often will be reasonably contestable at
any given moment in history.148
Widespread recognition of judges‟ interpretive
discretion—and of the mechanical model‟s corresponding
inaccuracy—is manifested in many ways. Consider, for
example, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996.149 In that legislation, Congress dramatically altered
the federal habeas landscape by directing federal judges to
deny habeas relief to any state prisoner whose claims have
146. Richard A. Posner, The Role of the Judge in the Twenty-First Century, 86
B.U. L. REV. 1049, 1053 (2006); see also id. at 1065-66 (elaborating on the factors
that cause the zone of reasonableness to appear wide or narrow to particular
judges in individual cases).
147. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 100 (1990); see also
id. (“The most important thing that law school imparts to its students is . . . an
awareness of approximately how plastic law is at the frontiers—neither
infinitely plastic . . . nor rigid and predetermined, as many laypersons think—
and of the permissible „moves‟ in arguing for, or against, a change in the law.”).
148. Jack Balkin explains:
No transhistorical set of criteria defines what is on the wall and what is
off the wall in legal argument. At any point in time, some arguments
are clearly frivolous, but the class of such arguments keeps changing,
and it changes in part through the very activity of making arguments
that skirt the boundaries of the implausible and off the wall.
Jack M. Balkin, Idolatry and Faith: The Jurisprudence of Sanford Levinson, 38
TULSA L. REV. 553, 568 (2003); cf. John B. Judis, Neutralized: Can American
Democracy Survive the Demise of Impartial Institutions?, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr.
28, 2011, at 16, 18 (“Discerning where disinterested readings of the law morph
into political activism—on both the left and the right—is a difficult and highly
imperfect business.”).
149. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104132, 110 Stat. 1214.
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already been adjudicated in state court proceedings, unless
that prior adjudication “resulted in a decision that was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States . . . .”150 When
presented with a claim that a state court has already
adjudicated, therefore, a federal judge in a habeas case
must do much more than merely determine whether he or
she believes the state court‟s conclusion was “correct” in the
sense that it is the same conclusion the federal judge would
have reached.151 Rather, even if the federal judge disagrees
with the state court‟s conclusion, he or she must deny
habeas relief if the state court‟s application of Supreme
Court precedent fell within (to borrow Judge Posner‟s
phrase) the “zone of reasonableness.”152 The Court has
explained that the breadth of that zone in a given case
depends heavily upon the nature of the legal rule or
standard being applied:
If a legal rule is specific, the range may be narrow. Applications of
the rule may be plainly correct or incorrect. Other rules are more
general, and their meaning must emerge in application over the
course of time. Applying a general standard to a specific case can
demand a substantial element of judgment. As a result,
evaluating whether a rule application was unreasonable requires
considering the rule‟s specificity. The more general the rule, the
more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case
153
determinations.

The mechanical model‟s inaccuracy also frequently
reveals itself in the context of judicial selection. When the
President nominates individuals for seats on the United
States Supreme Court or another prominent federal bench,
150. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006).
151. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000) (“For purposes of today‟s
opinion, the most important point is that an unreasonable application of federal
law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.”).
152. See Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786-87 (2011) (“As a condition
for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show
that the state court‟s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so
lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and
comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded
disagreement.”); see also supra note 146 and accompanying text (quoting Judge
Posner).
153. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004).
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the nominations typically draw scrutiny and controversy,
both of which would be far less likely to emerge if the law‟s
requirements always were clear. As political scientists Chris
Bonneau and Melinda Gann Hall recently observed, “[t]he
fact that politicians, organized interests, the media, and the
public all are concerned about seats on the United States
Supreme Court is prima facie evidence that judging is not
the neutral, impartial enterprise some would have us
believe.”154 When a judicial nomination does provoke
controversy, the nominee‟s proponents might argue that the
nominee will simply apply the law like a neutral umpire,
but such claims are unlikely to appease the nominee‟s
opponents—those claims simply do not accord with what we
know about the work that judges do. If we are wise to shun
the mechanical model in the setting of federal judicial
nominations, there is no reason to pay it any greater regard
when state judges stand for retention.
B. The Discretion-Based Interpretation of the Deontological
Argument
More sophisticated deontological arguments embrace
the fact that judges often must make discretionary
interpretive judgments within a zone of reasonableness
when deciding controversial cases.155 The rule of law
necessarily entails relying upon judges to make such
judgments, the argument here runs, and citizens thus fail to
respect the rule of law when they seek to oust judges merely
for issuing rulings with which those citizens disagree. There
are occasions when that argument is sound, but those
occasions are far less frequent than one might initially
suppose.
As a means of critiquing this form of argument, let us
imagine that a judge—we will call her Judge Jones—has
adjudicated a case involving abortion, same-sex marriage,
or some other persistently controversial matter. Drawing
from the prior subsection‟s discussion, let us further posit
that there was a zone of reasonableness in that case, such
that other judges applying the interpretive conventions of
154. CHRIS W. BONNEAU & MELINDA GANN HALL, IN DEFENSE
ELECTIONS 138 (2009).
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155. For a discussion of the “zone of reasonableness,” see supra notes 140-48
and accompanying text.
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the legal profession might have decided the case
differently.156 Judge Jones is now standing for retention and
a group of angry voters has coalesced to oppose her. With
respect to the ruling that has drawn the angry voters‟
attention, Judge Jones and her opponents will find
themselves in one of three different situations: either (1)
Judge Jones‟s ruling falls outside the zone of reasonableness
(that is, it falls outside the scope of permissible judicial
discretion); (2) Judge Jones‟s ruling falls within the zone of
reasonableness, but the angry voters‟ preferred ruling does
not; or (3) Judge Jones‟s ruling and the angry voters‟
preferred ruling both fall within the zone of reasonableness.
Judge Jones and her opponents almost certainly will
disagree about which of those scenarios best describes their
situation. That disagreement is not significant for my
purposes here, however, because my aim is simply to show
how infrequently the discretion-based deontological
argument is meritorious. To analyze the various
possibilities, I thus simply assume that we know which of
the three scenarios applies in a given instance. I take up
each of them in turn.
1. Scenario One: The Wayward Judge. If Judge Jones‟s
ruling falls outside the zone of reasonableness, there is no
deontological basis on which to argue that voters who hope
to oust her on Election Day fail to appreciate the rule of law
or the distinction between law and politics. To the contrary,
it is Judge Jones who appears not to understand or value
those fundamental precepts, and thus there is a
deontological argument in favor of removing her from the
bench. After all, she has strayed to the wrong side of the
law-politics divide by issuing a ruling that cannot be
justified within the universe of reasons that are properly
available to a judge. This is the claim that one hears most
frequently in anti-retention campaigns—that the targeted
judge is an “activist” who has behaved like a politician
rather than a member of the state bench, and that the
judge‟s removal is thus necessary to help restore the rule of
law.157 In Colorado, for example, the organization behind
that state‟s 2010 anti-retention campaign has declared that
one of its ongoing objectives is to “[e]ducate Colorado voters
156. See supra notes 141-54 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 7-13 and accompanying text (noting such anti-retention
arguments).
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on the importance of judges observing principles of the „rule
of law‟ in deciding cases.”158
Of course, Judge Jones‟s defenders might argue that she
has otherwise been a good judge and that her issuance of
one wayward ruling is not an appropriate reason to
terminate her service to the state.159 This is the same
argument that Fair Courts for Us made in 2010 when it
compared the Iowa Supreme Court‟s ruling on same-sex
marriage to a football referee‟s “questionable call,” and told
voters that “you shouldn‟t fire the good referees over just
one call.”160 If the claim here is that all judges make
mistakes and that it is unfair to end Judge Jones‟s judicial
career based on just one ruling, the argument will lack
credibility if Judge Jones refuses to concede that her
controversial ruling was indeed erroneous and thus refuses
to give voters any assurance that she will not make the
same mistake again—and Judge Jones surely will not offer
any such concession or assurance. If the argument is
instead that the state is unlikely to find a replacement who
will make fewer “questionable calls” than Judge Jones, the
argument will fail to persuade those who have particularly
strong feelings about the subject matter of Judge Jones‟s
controversial ruling, and it will suffer from the same
weaknesses that afflict all consequentialist arguments, as I
will discuss in Part III. In any event, if one looks at the
matter solely through a deontological lens, and if Judge
Jones has indeed exceeded the scope of permissible judicial
discretion, then concerns about the rule of law weigh
against her retention, rather than for it.
2. Scenario Two: The Wayward Voter. If Judge Jones‟s
ruling in the controversial case instead falls within the zone
of reasonableness, but the angry voters‟ preferred ruling
does not, then we have located a scenario in which there is a
sound deontological argument in favor of Judge Jones‟s
retention. When voters insist that Judge Jones should have
158. See
About
CTBC,
CLEAR
THE
BENCH
COLORADO,
http://www.clearthebenchcolorado.org/about/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2011).
159. Depending on its proponents‟ intended meaning, this argument could be
either deontological or consequentialist in nature. For a discussion of the
consequentialist side of the argument, see infra Part III.
160. See Schulte, supra note 69 (providing a citation for the audio and text of
Fair Courts for Us‟ advertisement).
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ruled in a way that the interpretive conventions of the legal
profession would not have allowed, they manifest a failure
to appreciate the rule of law and the distinction between
law and politics. Of course, making this argument
persuasively in an electoral setting is extraordinarily hard.
As Professor Geyh has observed, “[i]t is one thing to expect
voters with no training in the law to decide whether the
policies favored by senators and governors . . . coincide with
their own positions, and quite another to expect them to
decide whether the rulings of judges coincide with the
law.”161 Not only must Judge Jones convince angry voters
that her ruling falls within the range of legally permissible
outcomes, but she also must convince those voters that the
law is not sufficiently flexible to accommodate the outcome
that they would have preferred.
This is hardly the stuff of sound bites and thirty-second
television ads. Indeed, even members of the legal profession
often cannot agree on where the proper bounds of
interpretive discretion should be drawn,162 and so convincing
lay citizens that their preferred outcome was not legally
available to Judge Jones is no easy matter. Moreover—and
most importantly for our purposes here—this line of
argument is not commonly available, because the legal texts
that govern many controversial issues (like abortion, samesex marriage, and the death penalty) are written at a high
level of abstraction and are at least plausibly susceptible to
the competing interpretations that large segments of the
citizenry persistently give them. Public-policy debates in
these areas remain hotly contested year after year in part
because the relevant legal texts do not decisively foreclose
widely held sets of answers. In the cases that typically
spark the anger of significant numbers of voters, one simply
cannot ordinarily say that no reasonable judge could have
reached the conclusion that the angry voters preferred. But
in the rare instance in which all reasonable judges would
agree that the law did indeed preclude angry voters‟
preferred outcome, there is an analytically (even if perhaps
not politically) meritorious argument in favor of the
targeted judges‟ retention.
161. Geyh, supra note 96, at 59.
162. See supra notes 144-53 and accompanying text.
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3. Scenario Three: Battles Within the Realm of
Reasonable Disagreement. If Judge Jones‟s ruling and the
angry voters‟ preferred ruling both fall within the range of
conventionally
permissible
outcomes—and
the
indeterminacy of the legal texts that govern many hotly
contested issues is such that Judge Jones and her
opponents are likely to find themselves in this scenario—
then we are presented with a circumstance that demands
more patient analysis. There certainly are consequentialist
defenses that Judge Jones might raise (arguing, for
example, that the systemic costs of politicizing retention
elections outweigh the benefits of removing judges who
sometimes occupy a portion of the zone of reasonableness
that one does not favor),163 but those arguments encounter
their own set of obstacles, as I will discuss in Part III. Is
there any deontological reason why citizens‟ commitment to
the rule of law should compel them to refrain from ousting a
judge whose rulings sometimes occupy one segment of the
zone of reasonableness rather than another? In 2010, for
example, many moderates and liberals claimed injury to the
rule of law when conservative Iowa voters removed three of
the Iowa Supreme Court‟s seven justices from office.164 If a
justice akin to Antonin Scalia or Clarence Thomas had been
on the Iowa ballot instead, should those same moderates
and liberals have felt that their commitment to the rule of
law obliged them to vote in favor of retention?
Consequentialist concerns aside, voting to oust judges
because they occupy a politically disfavored portion of the
zone of reasonableness is entirely consistent with a
commitment to the rule of law. To understand why that is
so, we must briefly say more about citizens‟ sovereign
prerogatives and about the rule of law itself.
a. Citizens‟ Sovereign Prerogatives. Stepping back from
the retention-election context for a moment, it is a
fundamental principle of American constitutionalism that,
if a government official will wield the power to make law,
then it is a prerogative of the sovereign people to specify the
163. See supra Part I.C (describing consequentialist pro-retention arguments).
164. See A.G. Sulzberger, Ouster of Iowa Judges Sends Signal to the Bench,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2010, at A1.
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process by which that government official will be chosen.165
That principle holds true just as much for judges (who
shape the law through their discretionary interpretive
judgments)166 as it does for executives and legislators.
Although reasonable people can disagree as a policy matter
about how states should fill their judicial vacancies in the
first instance—whether by merit selection, unfettered
executive appointment, legislative election, contested
popular election, or some other process—all undoubtedly
would agree that the people of each state hold the raw
sovereign power (subject to applicable federal constitutional
constraints) to design whatever process they like for
choosing new judges.
When the sovereign people of a jurisdiction decide to fill
judicial vacancies by a method in which voters themselves
are not directly involved (such as by merit-selection or by
executive appointment with legislative advice and consent),
the people continue to hold the sovereign prerogative to
wield any indirect judiciary-shaping power they have
retained for themselves. At the federal level, for example,
the American people have given the President and the
Senate the direct power to fill judicial vacancies,167 but
165. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“We the People of the United States . . . do
ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.”); THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“We hold these Truths to be
self-evident, that . . . it is the Right of the People to . . . institute new
Government, laying its Foundation on such Principles, and organizing its
Powers in such Form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety
and Happiness.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 119, at 468 (“I trust the
friends of the proposed Constitution will never concur with its enemies in
questioning that fundamental principle of republican government which admits
the right of the people to alter or abolish the established Constitution whenever
they find it inconsistent with their happiness . . . .”).
166. See G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROFILES OF
LEADING AMERICAN JUDGES 460 (expanded ed. 1988) (“Judges in America can
declare and thereby make law. If one takes seriously the notion of law as a set of
guidelines for social conduct, American appellate judges have had abundant
opportunities to establish those guidelines.”); see also supra notes 42-50 and
accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court‟s ruling in Republican Party
of Minnesota v. White).
167. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall nominate, and by
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . Judges of the
supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments
are not herein otherwise provided for . . . .”).
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citizens routinely—and legitimately—vote for presidential
candidates based in part on the kinds of judges that those
candidates seem likely to nominate, and they lobby their
senators to support or oppose particular nominees. The
ABA‟s Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary might
credibly assure the nation that a given individual is
qualified to be a judge168 (or, in the language of Judge
Posner, that a given individual is likely to issue rulings that
fall within the zone of reasonableness),169 but no one would
argue that citizens and their elected leaders are obliged to
support a potential or actual nominee simply because he or
she has been deemed qualified by the legal profession‟s
leaders. Through the politicians they elect, citizens are
entitled to choose judges who seem likely to exercise their
interpretive discretion in ways that those citizens prefer,
and to avoid choosing judges who seem likely to exercise
their discretion in ways that are reasonable yet contrary to
the electorate‟s preferences.170
The question here is whether the analysis changes
when we shift from filling judicial vacancies in the first
instance to determining whether a sitting judge—a judge
whose interpretive predilections have become a matter of
record—ought to be retained. In the privacy of the voting
booth, individual citizens hold the raw power to vote against
a judge‟s retention for any reason at all. The matter in
dispute is whether voters‟ commitment to the rule of law
deontologically obliges them to refrain from opposing judges
who have demonstrated a willingness to rule in ways that
are legally permissible but that nevertheless are contrary to
168. See generally STANDING COMM. ON THE FED. JUDICIARY, AM. BAR ASS‟N,
WHAT IT IS AND HOW IT WORKS 1 (2009), available at http://www.american
bar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/federal_judiciary/federal_judiciar
y09.authcheckdam.pdf (“In conducting its evaluation of each prospective
[judicial] nominee, the Committee focuses strictly on professional qualifications:
integrity, professional competence and judicial temperament. The Committee
does not take into account a prospective nominee‟s philosophy, political
affiliation or ideology.”).
169. See supra note 146 and accompanying text (quoting Judge Posner).
170. Cf. Mariah Zeisberg, Should We Elect the US Supreme Court?, 7 PERSP.
POL. 785, 788 (2009) (“If the people are worthy of making decisions about their
constitutive political and legal institutions, we should be suspicious of claims
that the people are not capable of judging what kinds of interpretive
methodologies would best give effect to the promises of the document they
themselves have authorized.”).
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those voters‟ own legally permissible preferences. Citing
fidelity to the rule of law, proponents of deontological proretention arguments urge citizens not to pay any regard to
whether a judge standing for retention sometimes issues
rulings that occupy a segment of the zone of reasonableness
that those citizens do not favor. In light of the fundamental
principle that the sovereign people should make no
apologies for choosing lawmakers who share their own
commitments and values,171 the burden on proponents of
this argument is heavy. Whether that burden can be carried
depends squarely upon what fidelity to the rule of law
entails.
b. The Rule of Law. As Brian Tamanaha has observed,
the phrase “rule of law” is perhaps “the preeminent
legitimating political ideal in the world today,”172 but many
of those who use it do not “articulate precisely what it
means.”173 Moreover, when we do turn to the task of
fleshing out its meaning, we find that consensus is not
easily reached.174 Laypeople and scholars alike might agree
with Thomas Paine‟s revolutionary assertion that “in free

171. Cf. Carrington, supra note 15, at 107 (“If we are going to use courts to
decide whether there is a right to live or a right to die and to set the level of
taxation for schools or on cigarettes, then some accountability to the people is
required.”).
172. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON
(2004).

THE

RULE

OF

LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 4

173. Id. at 3; see also Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Rule of Law for Everyone?, in 55
CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 97, 98 (M.D.A. Freeman ed., 2002) (noting that the
rule of law is taken for granted as a defining characteristic of democracy). For a
discussion of the concept‟s origins, see Judith N. Shklar, Political Theory and
the Rule of Law, in THE RULE OF LAW: IDEAL OR IDEOLOGY 1, 1-5 (Allan C.
Hutchinson & Patrick Monahan eds., 1987) (crediting Aristotle and
Montesquieu with two different conceptions of the rule of law).
174. See Tamanaha, supra note 173, at 101 (“[T]he rule of law is strikingly like
the notion of the „good‟, in the sense that everyone is for it, but there is no
agreement on precisely what it is.”); Jeremy Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an
Essentially Contested Concept (in Florida)?, 21 LAW & PHIL. 137, 159 (2002)
(“[T]he lead idea of the Rule of Law is that somehow respect for law can take the
edge off human political power, making it less objectionable, less dangerous . . . .
But we disagree on how this can be done, and whether it can ever be done
completely.”).
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countries the law ought to be King,”175 but they will have
different understandings of what it means for the law to be
“in charge” in this way.176 Given this lack of clarity and
consensus, it is tempting to conclude that invocations of the
rule of law in public discourse are often nothing more than
hollow attempts to persuade one‟s political opponents to
surrender177—it is tempting to conclude, in other words, that
those invocations are often mere “ruling-class chatter”178 or
dressed-up declarations of “Hooray for our side!”179
Among those who use it more thoughtfully, the phrase
“rule of law” has either substantive or formal meaning. For
those who take the substantive view, a legal system adheres
to the rule of law only if it protects certain individual rights
and thereby achieves the vision of political morality
endorsed by the proponents of the substantive conception. 180
If our Judge Jones invokes a substantive understanding of
the rule of law as part of her retention campaign, she likely
is claiming that the particular rights that were vindicated
in her controversial ruling are essential in any society that
claims allegiance to the rule of law, and that those who
disapprove of her ruling thus fail to understand the rule of
law‟s requirements. If Judge Jones rhetorically deploys the
175. THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE (1776), reprinted in PETER LINEBAUGH
PRESENTS THOMAS PAINE: RIGHTS OF MAN AND COMMON SENSE 3, 31 (Jessica
Kimpell ed., 2009) (emphasis omitted).
176. Waldron, supra note 174, at 157 (stating that there are competing
definitions of the “Rule of Law,” but that all of those definitions are attempts to
define what it would mean for “law [to be] in charge in a society” (emphasis
omitted)).
177. Cf. NEUMANN, supra note 115, at 23 (“[P]olitically charged concepts like
the rule of law are not defined for lexicographic or semantic purposes; they are
defined according to an agenda.”).
178. Shklar, supra note 173, at 1 (noting, but not endorsing, this view); see
also id. (“It would not be very difficult to show that the phrase “the Rule of Law”
has become . . . just another one of those self-congratulatory rhetorical devices
that grace the public utterances of Anglo-American politicians.”).
179. Waldron, supra note 174, at 139 (noting, but not endorsing, this view).
180. See Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV.
781, 783 (1989) (“The substantive version holds that the Rule of Law embodies
tenets of a particular political morality.”); see also id. at 783-84 (identifying
John Rawls as a proponent of this view). See generally RONALD DWORKIN, A
MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 11-18 (1985) (defending a substantive conception of the
rule of law).
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rule of law in this way, she is using it to defend the
controversial ruling itself. As we have seen, however, reallife judges and their defenders rarely make any sustained
effort to defend the particular rulings that have sparked
voters‟ anger, choosing instead to build their retention
campaigns on the themes of judicial independence, fairness,
and impartiality.181 In those campaigns, one certainly does
not typically find attempts to articulate and defend the
substantive conception of the rule of law on which this line
of argument depends. That is not surprising. Not only do
targeted judges and their champions shy away from
defending controversial rulings as a general matter, but
those who thoughtfully hold the substantive understanding
of the rule of law are relatively few in number.182
The formal understanding of the rule of law is more
prevalent.183 Under the formal understanding, a society may
properly claim fidelity to the rule of law even if its legal
regime is substantively quite brutal—a view propounded by
Friedrich Hayek,184 Joseph Raz,185 and Brian Tamanaha,186
among many others. Yet substantive concerns about human
autonomy and dignity are not shoved wholly to the side.
Rather, formalists posit that the rule of law honors human
autonomy and dignity by helping to set up the conditions in
which individuals are protected from arbitrary exercises of
governmental power and can reliably plan their own

181. See supra Part I.A.
182. See Tamanaha, supra note 173, at 101 (“[A] few legal theorists[ ] believe
that the rule of law . . . necessarily entails protection of individual rights.”).
183. See id. (stating that “most legal theorists” subscribe to some version of the
formal view).
184. See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 72-73 (1944) (defending a
purely formal understanding of the rule of law).
185. See Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtues, in READINGS IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 32, 33 (John Arthur & William H. Shaw eds., 5th ed. 2010)
(“[T]his conception of the rule of law is a formal one. It says nothing about how
the law is to be made: by tyrants, democratic majorities, or any other way. It
says nothing about fundamental rights, about equality, or justice.”).
186. See, e.g., Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Rule of Law and Legal Pluralism in
Development, 3 HAGUE J. RULE L. 1, 5-6 (2011) (“The law can be bad, unfair, or
harsh, yet still be consistent with the rule of law (think of former racial
segregation laws in the USA). An oppressive legal order can satisfy the rule of
law . . . .”).
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futures.187 Scholars give varying recitations of what those
conditions precisely entail, but those recitations commonly
echo three interrelated themes.
First, in a society in which the rule of law prevails, no
government official (judicial or non-judicial) can hold totally
unfettered discretion to adversely affect others‟ interests
when carrying out his or her official duties.188 As Tom
Bingham writes, “[t]he rule of law does not require that
official or judicial decision-makers should be deprived of all
discretion, but it does require that no discretion should be
unconstrained so as to be potentially arbitrary.”189
Second, the rule of law demands that no one be above
the law; citizens and government officials alike must be
bound by the law‟s requirements.190 If a government official
187. See Raz, supra note 185, at 35 (“[T]he rule of law is necessary if the law is
to respect human dignity. Respecting human dignity entails . . . respecting
[people‟s] autonomy, their right to control their future.”); Tamanaha, supra note
173, at 112 (“The primary import of the rule of law . . . in the context of
liberalism is . . . that when individuals know the rules in advance they are free
to do anything they wish outside of what the rules proscribe.”).
188. See A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE
CONSTITUTION 188 (10th ed. 1965) (“[Under English law] no man is punishable
or can be lawfully made to suffer in body or goods except for a distinct breach of
law established in the ordinary legal manner before the ordinary courts of the
land.”); TAMANAHA, supra note 172, at 122 (“[T]o live under the rule of law is not
to be subject to the unpredictable vagaries of other individuals . . . .”); James L.
Gibson, Changes in American Veneration for the Rule of Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV.
593, 595 (2007) (“In its simplest form, the rule of law is little more than proper
procedure. In a democracy, rulers are bound to follow established procedures
and legal rules, which significantly constrain their discretion.”); Tamanaha,
supra note 173, at 105 (“The core idea of the rule of law, the thread that has run
for over two thousand years, . . . is that . . . government officials . . . should
operate within a framework of law—that the sovereign is limited by the law.”).
189. TOM BINGHAM, THE RULE OF LAW 54 (2010) (emphasis added); see also
Burton, supra note 143, at 193 (“In principle, judicial discretion can be
reconciled with the rule of law when the law constrains the set of reasons upon
which judges act lawfully.”).
190. See BINGHAM, supra note 189, at 8 (“The core of the existing principle is
. . . that all persons and authorities within the state, whether public or private,
should be bound by and entitled to the benefit of laws publicly made . . . .”);
DICEY, supra note 188, at 193 (“[Under English law] every man, whatever be his
rank or condition, is subject to the ordinary law of the realm and amenable to
the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals.”); Gibson, supra note 188, at 597
(“[T]he rule of law constrains both rulers and the ruled. The rulers must act
according to legal procedure, which means they must rule through legislatures

116

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60

or private citizen wishes to take a course of action that the
law does not permit, he or she must refrain from taking that
course of action until the law has been changed through
established lawmaking procedures.191
Third, the rule of law requires that a society‟s legal
regime possess a cluster of additional traits aimed at
enabling individuals to take account of the law‟s
requirements when planning their future conduct.192 As Raz
writes, “[t]his is the basic intuition from which the doctrine
of the rule of law derives: the law must be capable of
guiding the behavior of its subjects.”193 For this to occur, a
and courts. The ruled are obliged to follow and acquiesce to these laws.”);
Massimo La Torre, „Jurists, Bad Christians‟: Torture and the Rule of Law, in
TORTURE: MORAL ABSOLUTES AND AMBIGUITIES 10, 21 (Bev Clucas et al. eds.,
2009) (rejecting the assertion of “exceptional executive powers of the U.S.
president as commander in chief of the armed forces, a capacity in which (as the
argument goes) the president has free rein and cannot be held accountable
under any national or international law”); Raz, supra note 185, at 32 (“Taken in
its broadest sense [the rule of law] means that people should obey the law and
be ruled by it. But in political and legal theory it has come to be read in a
narrower sense, that the government shall be ruled by the law and subject to
it.”).
191. See TAMANAHA, supra note 172, at 114-15 (stating that the rule of law
demands that government officials be constrained by the law and that they obey
it until it has been changed through legally authorized procedures); Gibson,
supra note 188, at 597 (“[T]he essential ingredient of the rule of law is
universalism—the law should be universally heeded. If a law generates an
undesirable outcome, it ought to be changed through established procedures; it
should not be manipulated or ignored.”). Alexander Hamilton echoed this theme
in The Federalist No. 78:
Until the people have, by some solemn and authoritative act, annulled
or changed the established form [of the Constitution], it is binding upon
themselves collectively, as well as individually; and no presumption, or
even knowledge of their sentiments, can warrant their representatives
in a departure from it prior to such an act.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 119, at 468.
192. See HAYEK, supra note 184, at 72 (“[T]he Rule of Law . . . means that
government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced
beforehand—rules which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the
authority will use its coercive powers in given circumstances and to plan one‟s
individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge.”); Tamanaha, supra note 186,
at 4 (“At a minimum, [the rule of law] assumes that legal rules exist and that
government officials and citizens know what the rules require in connection
with their actions . . . .”).
193. Raz, supra note 185, at 33.
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society‟s laws must be public and intelligible (a person
cannot conform her conduct to laws whose contents she
cannot locate or understand);194 conduct-restricting laws
must generally be prospective rather than retroactive in
application (a person cannot plan his past conduct);195 laws
cannot demand conduct that is impossible to perform (a
person cannot plan to do impossible things);196 and laws
must be sufficiently stable to enable an individual to
intelligently assess proposed courses of action (a person
cannot intelligently choose among alternative actions if she
cannot make reasonably reliable predictions about the law‟s
likely response to those actions).197
None of those precepts precludes a citizen from voting
against a state judge who sometimes represents a portion of
the zone of reasonableness that the citizen does not favor.
One can be firmly committed to the propositions that judges
and other government officials must operate under
meaningful constraints, that no one is above the law, and
194. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 49-51, 63-65 (rev. ed. 1969)
(discussing the rule of law‟s insistence that laws be publicly promulgated and
reasonably clear); TAMANAHA, supra note 172, at 119 (stating that laws must be
“public”); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
1175, 1179 (1989) (“Even in simpler times uncertainty has been regarded as
incompatible with the Rule of Law. Rudimentary justice requires that those
subject to the law must have the means of knowing what it prescribes.”). Raz
points out that compliance with the rule of law in this respect is a matter of
degree, and that total compliance is impossible—no society‟s laws can
reasonably be purged of all vagueness. Raz, supra note 185, at 36. Tamanaha
observes that the rule of law is often said to be in decline in the West, as
administrative officials acquire increased discretion and as judges increasingly
are relied upon to apply broad standards that entail wide-ranging subjective
judgments. Tamanaha, supra note 173, at 102-03.
195. See FULLER, supra note 194, at 51-62 (arguing that laws generally must
be prospective in nature, but that there are instances when retroactivity and the
rule of law are not in conflict); TAMANAHA, supra note 172, at 119 (stating that
the rule of law requires “prospective laws”); Raz, supra note 185, at 33 (same).
196. See FULLER, supra note 194, at 70-79 (elaborating on this theme).
197. See id. at 79-81 (arguing that the rule of law demands “constancy” in the
law through time); Raz, supra note 185, at 33 (making the same point). Of
course, the rule of law does not demand that a society‟s laws be utterly
unchanging—what is required is the ability to make reasonably reliable
predictions. Cf. NEUMANN, supra note 115, at 12 (“Even in a judicially fair
system, we must, to plan rationally, assess the moods and fashions of our society
to know how broadly the various laws are nowadays interpreted, and how
seriously they are taken.”).
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that individuals must be able to take the law‟s requirements
meaningfully into account when planning their future
conduct, and still vote against a judge‟s bid for retention
with the hope that the judge‟s replacement will favor a
different segment of the zone of reasonableness. Pointing to
the second of the three rule of law themes,198 one might
suggest that ousting judges is not a legitimate means of
securing legal change. Yet this would beg the question of
what is and is not legitimate law-shaping behavior in a
society committed to the rule of law, and would sit in strong
tension with the widely accepted practice of using judicial
appointments to move the law in one direction rather than
another. Alternatively, pointing to the third theme,199 one
might argue that ousting judges in response to controversial
rulings introduces excessive instability into the given
jurisdiction‟s legal regime. Yet ousting a judge does not
itself directly bring about any change in the law, and any
legal changes that might eventually flow from such ousters
are no more destabilizing than the legal changes that
elected legislators introduce into legal systems every day.
Thus, there is no deontological conflict between holding
a firm commitment to the rule of law and opposing a judge‟s
bid for retention because one would prefer a judge who more
frequently occupies a different segment of the zone of
reasonableness. The only occasion when one finds a conflict
between the rule of law and an anti-retention campaign
provoked by a controversial ruling is when the angry voters‟
own preferred outcome in the controversial case would not
itself have fallen within the zone of reasonableness that
defines the limits of judges‟ interpretive discretion.200
Setting those uncommon instances aside, one must conclude
that deontological invocations of the rule of law against
anti-retention campaigns usually are just a rhetorical
device aimed at “cramp[ing] and compress[ing] the ability of

198. See supra notes 190-91 and accompanying text (discussing the second
theme, that no one can be above the law).
199. See supra note 197 and accompanying text (discussing the relevant
component of the third theme and arguing that constancy in the rule of law
allows individuals to take the law into account when planning future conduct).
200. See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the “wayward voter”).
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individuals to debate and define the conditions of their
communal life.”201
If judges and their defenders hope to find winning
arguments when urging voters to retain judges with whom
they sometimes disagree, they thus must look to arguments
that are consequentialist in nature. It is to the persuasive
power of those arguments that I now turn.
III. THE RHETORICAL WEAKNESSES OF CONSEQUENTIALISM
Pro-retention forces make heavy use of consequentialist
arguments, warning that denying retention to judges
because they have written or joined controversial rulings
poses threats to the integrity of states‟ judicial systems.
They argue that such ousters send other judges the message
that they must engage in significant fundraising for their
own retention campaigns, and this fundraising then lays
the groundwork for actual or perceived conflicts of interest;
they argue that such ousters increase the likelihood that
judges will decide cases based upon anticipated electoral
consequences rather than the thrust of the law; and they
warn that such ousters particularly threaten the project of
constitutionalism by increasing the likelihood that judges
will adjudicate constitutional cases in accordance with
likely voters‟ short-term preferences rather than the
sovereign people‟s long-term constitutional commitments.202
Assessed strictly on their merits, arguments aimed at
insulating state judges from political accountability are a
tough sell. Judicial elections are prevalent in states across
the country precisely because the American people have
long insisted upon retaining some mechanism for holding
state judges electorally accountable for their actions.203
201. Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick Monahan, Democracy and the Rule of
Law, in THE RULE OF LAW: IDEAL OR IDEOLOGY, supra note 173, at 97, 111 (using
the quoted language to condemn certain rhetorical uses of the rule of law as
antidemocratic).
202. See supra Part I.C (describing these consequentialist arguments).
203. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text (discussing the prevalence
of judicial elections); see also supra note 24 and accompanying text (stating that
twentieth-century opponents of head-to-head judicial elections perceived that
merit-selection processes would not be a politically salable means of filling
judicial vacancies in the first instance if retention elections were not included
somewhere in the mix).
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When voters perceive (rightly or wrongly) that state judges
have abused their power in some important domain, they
are not easily persuaded that judges should remain beyond
voters‟ reach. To the contrary, appeals for political
insularity often serve only to underscore the very problem
that targeted judges‟ opponents have diagnosed—namely,
that those judges regard themselves as free to disregard the
will of the sovereign people.204
Opponents of same-sex marriage explicitly made that
very point in their successful 2010 campaign against three
of the Varnum justices in Iowa.205 In a frequently aired
television advertisement, the narrator‟s opening words cut
straight to the issue of accountability: “Some in the ruling
class say it is wrong for voters to hold Supreme Court
judges accountable for their decisions.”206 After condemning
Varnum (over images of parents, Boy Scouts, hunters, and
flag-saluting schoolchildren), the narrator closed with this
exhortation: “To hold activist judges accountable, flip your
ballot over and vote no on retention of Supreme Court
justices.”207 When voters perceive that judges regard
themselves as “ruling class” elites who feel entitled to shape
a jurisdiction‟s moral contours, pro-retention forces are not
likely to find much traction with the warning that
politicized retention elections will prompt other judges to
worry about the electoral consequences of their rulings. At
least in some instances, worrying about electoral
consequences is precisely what anti-retention forces would
like judges to do.
For purposes of the following discussion, however, let us
posit that the leading pro-retention consequentialist
arguments are fully meritorious—let us assume, in other
words, that it is important to spare state judges from having
to raise campaign funds and from having to worry about
how their rulings will play on Election Day. Wholly apart
from their merits, consequentialist arguments of this sort
204. See Reid, supra note 81, at 72 (discussing Justice White‟s and Justice
Lanphier‟s respective 1996 defeats in Tennessee and Nebraska and the
criticisms that they were “out-of-step” with popular opinion); see also supra
notes 81-92 and accompanying text (discussing those two elections).
205. See supra notes 7, 62-69 and accompanying text (discussing that election).
206. Nation for Marriage, supra note 63.
207. Id.
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are rhetorically hobbled by the fact that they are indeed
consequentialist in nature.
A. Sacred Values, Taboo Trade-offs, and the Aversion to
Consequentialism
Most anti-retention campaigns are fueled by morally
outraged voters‟ belief that sacred values are at stake—
values that, by their very nature, resist consequentialist
pleas for compromise. Targeted judges‟ consequentialist
arguments also threaten to alienate voters from some of
their core commitments. These arguments suffer the effects
of discounting, and they have difficulty gaining a foothold in
settings where voters rely upon like-minded cultural
authorities to help them sort through competing empirical
claims. Finally, even if consequentialist arguments can
overcome all of those daunting obstacles, they contain an
inherent tension that threatens to strip them of any
remaining rhetorical force.
1. Sacred Values and Their Concomitants. In a
pluralistic society like the United States, citizens with
conflicting values and commitments frequently must
negotiate their differences by
making
whatever
compromises and trade-offs are necessary in order to
produce mutually satisfactory public policies.208 There are
areas, however, in which individuals hold what
psychologists, sociologists, and others call “sacred” or
“protected” values—values that “a moral community
implicitly or explicitly treats as possessing infinite or
transcendental significance that precludes comparisons,
trade-offs, or indeed any other mingling with bounded or
secular values.”209 Because sacred values are absolutist in
208. Cf. A. Peter McGraw & Philip E. Tetlock, Taboo Trade-Offs, Relational
Framing, and the Acceptability of Exchanges, 15 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 2, 2
(2005) (“Many theories of judgment and choice rest on the premise that people
make judgments and decisions as intuitive economists . . . who are prepared to
confront uncertainty, trade-offs, and opportunity costs to make the best
decisions in competitive markets.”).
209. Philip E. Tetlock et al., The Psychology of the Unthinkable: Taboo TradeOffs, Forbidden Base Rates, and Heretical Counterfactuals, 78 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 853, 853 (2000) [hereinafter Tetlock, The Psychology of the
Unthinkable]; see also Jonathan Baron & Mark Spranca, Protected Values, 70
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 1, 3 (1997) (“We call the
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nature, they are strongly correlated with deontological
modes of reasoning210: making decisions that implicate these
values is less about assessing the consequences of a
proposed course of action and more about manifesting the
kind of person that one understands oneself to be.211 Some
sacred values are religious in origin, while others are not. A
person may hold sacred values concerning racial equality,
for example, or concerning a woman‟s ability to control her
own reproductive capacities.212 Whatever their origin, the
hallmark of sacred values is their holders‟ perception that
those values are non-fungible and thus should not be traded
off against non-sacred values.213 The holder of sacred values
values in question „protected‟ to emphasize the fact that their defining property
is the reluctance of their holders to trade them off with other values.”); Philip E.
Tetlock, Thinking the Unthinkable: Sacred Values and Taboo Cognitions, 7
TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 320, 320 (2003) (“[P]eople often insist with apparently
great conviction that certain commitments and relationships are sacred and
that even to contemplate trade-offs with the secular values of money or
convenience is anathema.”).
210. See Baron & Spranca, supra note 209, at 3 (stating that protected values
express their holders‟ commitment to deontological rules, such that those
individuals feel that they must engage in certain kinds of behavior no matter
what the consequences); Carmen Tanner et al., Influence of Deontological Versus
Consequentialist Orientations on Act Choices and Framing Effects: When
Principles are More Important than Consequences, 38 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 757,
764-66 (2008) (noting the association between protected values and deontology);
Carmen Tanner & Douglas L. Medin, Protected Values: No Omission Bias and
No Framing Effects, 11 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 185, 185 (2004) (“[Protected
values] are believed to arise from deontological principles, rather than from
consequentialist assessments of gains and losses.”).
211. McGraw & Tetlock, supra note 208, at 2; cf. MAX WEBER, The Vocation of
Politics, in THE ESSENTIAL WEBER: A READER 257, 261-62 (Sam Whimster ed.,
2004) (distinguishing between an “ethic of conviction,” which pays no regard to
consequences, and an “ethic of responsibility,” which takes account of the
consequences of one‟s actions).
212. See Morgan Marietta, From My Cold, Dead Hands: Democratic
Consequences of Sacred Rhetoric, 70 J. POL. 767, 768 (2008) (“Modern sacredness
has come to comprise both the religious and secular sacred, grounded in
pluralistic sources of authority that establish for different individuals and
groups the limits of the tolerable and negotiable, the boundaries of the sacred.”).
213. See Baron & Spranca, supra note 209, at 4 (“The defining property of
protected values is absoluteness.”); Alan Page Fiske & Philip E. Tetlock, Taboo
Trade-Offs: Reactions to Transactions that Transgress the Spheres of Justice, 18
POL. PSYCHOL. 255, 256 (1997) (stating that sacred values entail “moral limits to
fungibility”).
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might not carry the principle of absoluteness to its extreme
by shunning consequentialist reasoning entirely, but when
presented with an option that threatens those values, he or
she is likely to be powerfully disposed to regard that option
as morally troubling regardless of the consequences that
might flow from rejecting it.214
One frequently finds such values expressed in culturally
divisive areas of public policy.215 The National Rifle
Association‟s slogan “from my cold, dead hands,” for
example, makes an absolutist claim about gun ownership
and disclaims any possibility of compromise.216 Some
opponents of same-sex marriage uncompromisingly
condemn government leaders “who would try to redefine
God‟s institution and say that marriage is anything other
than one man and one woman.”217 Some citizens insist that
abortion is murder and that the practice should be banned

214. See Tanner et al., supra note 210, at 764-66 (reporting the authors‟
empirical finding of a strong correlation between protected values and a
deontological decision-making orientation, but noting that holders of protected
values do not entirely foreclose entertaining consequentialist arguments); see
also Rumen Iliev et al., Attending to Moral Values, in MORAL JUDGMENT AND
DECISION MAKING 169, 188 (Daniel M. Bartels et al. eds., 2009) (concluding that
the holders of sacred values are not always rigidly insensitive to consequences).
If the proposed violation of a sacred value is small and the benefits secured by
the violation are great, for example, holders of sacred values show an increased
willingness to compromise the sacred value. See Jonathan Baron & Sarah
Leshner, How Serious Are Expressions of Protected Values?, 6 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 183, 192-93 (2000) (summarizing the results of the authors‟
empirical research, including the finding that holders of protected values will
accept actions that violate the values when the harm is small compared to the
benefit); see also Ilana Ritov & Jonathan Baron, Protected Values and Omission
Bias, 79 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 79, 81 (1999)
(stating that if the consequences of fully honoring a sacred value are sufficiently
onerous, the holder of the value may be willing to compromise by weighing the
sacred value against the undesirability of the threatened consequences).
215. See Marietta, supra note 212, at 768 (describing the invocation of sacred
values in areas such as abortion, gay marriage, gun rights, the death penalty,
and environmentalism).
216. See id. at 770-71 (citing this example).
217. Jason Hancock, Chuck Hurley: Ousting Iowa Supreme Court Justices Was
„God‟s Will,‟ IOWA INDEP. (Nov. 3, 2010), http://iowaindependent.com/
46996/chuck-hurley-ousting-iowa-supreme-court-justices-was-gods-will (quoting
Chuck Hurley, president of the conservative Iowa Family Policy Center).
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even in cases of rape and incest,218 while others insist that
the government is never entitled to restrict a woman‟s
ability to terminate her own pregnancy. 219 Some argue that
the death penalty amounts to state-sanctioned murder that
can never be justified,220 while others argue that there are
instances in which execution is the only morally acceptable
punishment.221 In these and other areas, many citizens
profess that they are committed to their core values no
matter what the circumstances or the costs.
For those who hold a set of values as sacred, there thus
is a powerful moral aversion to “taboo trade-offs”—tradeoffs that entail compromising one‟s commitment to sacred
values in order to accommodate other, less exalted values.222
Even taking time to consider a taboo trade-off can render a
decision-maker morally suspect: “[T]he longer observers
believe that decision makers contemplated compromising
sacred values, even if they ultimately do the right thing and
support sacred values, the more intense the outrage they

218. See,
e.g.,
Should
Abortion
Be
Allowed?,
GODVOTER.ORG,
http://www.godvoter.org/abortion-should-be-allowed.html (last visited Nov. 12,
2011) (making these arguments).
219. See, e.g., Bans on Abortion After 12 Weeks, NARAL PRO-CHOICE AMERICA,
http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/what-is-choice/abortion/abortion-bans.html
(last visited Nov. 12, 2011) (“The decision whether to have an abortion should be
made by a woman, with her doctor and her loved ones. Politicians should play
no part in this decision.”).
220. See,
e.g.,
Abolish
the
Death
Penalty,
AMNESTY
INT‟L,
http://www.amnesty.org/en/death-penalty (last visited Nov. 12, 2011) (“The
death penalty is the ultimate denial of human rights. It is the premeditated and
cold-blooded killing of a human being by the state.”).
221. See, e.g., Home, PRO-DEATH PENALTY.COM, http://www.prodeath
penalty.com/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2011) (“Why do we hear so much about the
killers and so little about the victims and their loved ones who are left behind to
pick up the pieces?”).
222. See McGraw & Tetlock, supra note 208, at 4 (“[Taboo trade-offs] entail
comparisons of the relative importance of secular values (e.g., money, time, and
convenience) with sacred values that are supposed to be infinitely significant.”);
Tetlock, The Psychology of the Unthinkable, supra note 209, at 854 (“[R]igidity,
accompanied by righteous indignation and by blanket refusal even to
contemplate certain thoughts, can be commendable—indeed, it is essential for
resolutely reasserting the identification of self with the collective moral order.”
(citation omitted)).
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direct at those decision makers.”223 If a parent contemplates
prostituting one of her children for rent money, for example,
she almost assuredly will perceive that her mere
contemplation of the transaction constitutes a serious moral
transgression, even if she ultimately rejects the possibility.
One who wrestles with a taboo trade-off (rather than
rejecting it outright) may subsequently feel the need to
engage in conduct that provides “moral cleansing”—conduct
that reaffirms one‟s commitment to sacred values and
thereby restores one‟s identity and place within the
community.224 After all (one tells oneself), decision-making
options that entail compromising sacred values are
supposed to be easy to reject; surely it is a sign of a moral
failing if rejecting those options consumes significant
cognitive energy.225 The moral aversion to taboo trade-offs is
so powerful that merely witnessing another person
contemplate or advocate such a trade-off can cause one to
feel a need for dissociative moral purification.226

223. Tetlock, The Psychology of the Unthinkable, supra note 209, at 855; see
also Fiske & Tetlock, supra note 213, at 256 (“People reject certain comparisons
because they feel that seriously considering the relevant trade-offs would
undercut their self-images and social identities as moral beings.”).
224. Tetlock, The Psychology of the Unthinkable, supra note 209, at 855.
225. See Sarah Lichtenstein et al., What‟s Bad Is Easy: Taboo Values, Affect,
and Cognition, 2 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 169, 184 (2007) (“If it‟s bad
enough to be taboo, then it‟s easy to know what to do, and help with thinking
carefully is not likely to be accepted when a proposal is so clearly wrong.”).
Indeed, the ease with which some decisions involving sacred values can be made
may be part of sacred values‟ appeal. See Marietta, supra note 212, at 771
(“Psychologists argue that humans have a propensity to be „cognitive misers,‟
expending only the minimum amount of mental energy sufficient to the task at
hand. . . . In this sense, absolutist reasoning may be more efficient.” (citation
omitted)). Empirical research indicates that decision-makers do indeed find
decisions easy to make when those decisions pit a sacred value against nonsacred values. See Martin Hanselmann & Carmen Tanner, Taboos and Conflicts
in Decision Making: Sacred Values, Decision Difficulty, and Emotions, 3
JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 51, 58-60 (2008) (summarizing the results of the
authors‟ empirical research and finding that people tend not to trade off their
sacred values for other values). By the same token, decision-makers find that
the most difficult decisions to make are those that demand “tragic trade-offs”—
decisions that pit a sacred value against another sacred value, such that the
decision-maker cannot fully honor both of the values. See id.
226. See McGraw & Tetlock, supra note 208, at 4.
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Political leaders frequently invoke sacred values,
encouraging citizens to remain faithful to their core moral
commitments, no matter what the consequences.227 Invoking
sacred values in this way can bring politicians at least two
significant benefits. First, it can create a “valorization
effect,” whereby voters perceive those politicians as leaders
who are “more principled, virtuous, and determined than
others,” thereby increasing their appeal on Election Day.228
Second, sacred rhetoric can increase voter turnout by
stirring citizens‟ emotions, by communicating to voters that
their moral and cultural identities are at stake, and by
offering citizens an opportunity to use their ballots as a way
“to morally cleanse any disquieting or disreputable
affiliation with a sacred violation.”229
Appeals to sacred values are especially prominent in
politically conservative circles. In a study of all presidential
debates between 1976 and 2004, for example, political
scientist Morgan Marietta found that Democrats tended to
focus on the complexity of public policy and on competing
claims about consequences, while Republicans were more
likely to make absolutist claims grounded in sacred
values.230 “Democrats are publicly committed to doing what
is best,” Marietta concluded, “while Republicans are
publicly committed to doing what is right.”231 Observing that
same phenomenon, Donald Braman and Dan Kahan note
that liberals often “disclaim reliance on contested versions
of the good life and instead base arguments on grounds
acceptable to citizens of diverse moral outlooks.”232 Liberals
tend to embrace consequentialist modes of argument,
Braman and Kahan write, “[b]ecause [consequentialist
227. See Marietta, supra note 212, at 768 (arguing that sacred rhetoric
discourages consequentialist modes of reasoning in favor of absolutist modes of
reasoning).
228. Morgan Marietta, The Absolutist Advantage: Sacred Rhetoric in
Contemporary Presidential Debate, 26 POL. COMM. 388, 388 (2009); see also id. at
393-94 (citing empirical support for the valorization effect).
229. Marietta, supra note 212, at 772; see also id. at 769-71 (discussing this
concept further).
230. Marietta, supra note 228, at 394-98.
231. Id. at 406.
232. Donald Braman & Dan M. Kahan, Overcoming the Fear of Guns, the Fear
of Gun Control, and the Fear of Cultural Politics: Constructing a Better Gun
Debate, 55 EMORY L.J. 569, 583 (2006).
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arguments] elide contestable judgments of value, . . . [they]
are the „don‟t ask, don‟t tell‟ solution to cultural disputes in
the law . . . .”233
2. The Implications for Judicial Retention Elections.
Values held as sacred within politically conservative circles
are plainly playing a powerful role in the new wave of
highly politicized judicial retention elections. In 2010, for
example, opposition to abortion was the driving force in
Alaska and Kansas,234 opposition to same-sex marriage was
the driving force in Iowa,235 and opposition to favorable
treatment of violent felons was (at least ostensibly) one of
the driving forces in Illinois.236 In Florida, the focal point
was the Florida Supreme Court‟s refusal to allow citizens to
vote on a proposed constitutional amendment that would
have barred the state from requiring individuals to buy
health insurance—a requirement that violates some
people‟s deeply held values of autonomy.237 In 1986, the
primary issue in California was the targeted justices‟
perceived determination to spare convicted murderers from
execution.238 In 1996, the issue in Tennessee was a ruling
233. Id. Braman and Kahan argue that when moderates avoid debates about
core values and focus instead on consequentialist arguments, they cede the
stage to “cultural zealots” who then further entrench in their battles against one
another. Id. at 571.
234. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (noting the Alaska election);
supra note 13 and accompanying text (noting the Kansas election).
235. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (describing the Iowa election).
236. The campaign against Chief Justice Kilbride originated with concerns
about tort damages, but anti-retention forces built their public campaign
against him on issues relating to criminal defendants, perceiving that they
thereby had a better shot at persuading voters. See supra note 12 and
accompanying text (describing the Illinois election).
237. See, e.g., 155 CONG. REC. S13,730 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 2009) (statement of
Sen. Jon Kyl) (arguing that requiring individuals to purchase health insurance
is “a stunning assault on liberty”); see also supra note 11 and accompanying text
(noting the 2010 Florida election). Although it is less obvious, values relating to
autonomy may also have been in play in Colorado, where one of the primary
focal points was the Colorado Supreme Court‟s role in increasing citizens‟ tax
burdens. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (describing the Colorado
election).
238. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text (describing the California
election).
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favorable to a convicted murderer and rapist.239 In Nebraska
that same year, one of the central issues was a series of
rulings that made it more difficult to convict individuals of
second-degree murder.240 In each of these instances, the
targeted judges had issued rulings that some voters found
morally outrageous.
Pro-retention forces‟ consequentialist arguments might
effectively persuade voters who come to the table in a
neutral frame of mind, but they are poorly designed to
persuade morally outraged voters to set aside their anger
about judges‟ controversial rulings on Election Day. Rather
than directly engage judges‟ opponents in a debate about
the values they deem sacred, proponents of consequentialist
arguments ask those angry voters to do two things that
many of them find morally objectionable: to ignore the taboo
trade-offs that they believe the targeted judges made in
their controversial rulings, and to make a taboo trade-off of
their own by voting to allow the unrepentant moral
transgressors to remain on the bench because ousting them
could lead to other forms of improper judicial behavior down
the road.241 What targeted judges‟ consequentialist
arguments ask voters to do, in other words, is compromise
sacred values that, by their very nature, purport to be
absolute and non-fungible.
In the eyes of many conservative voters, for example,
the justices who struck down Iowa‟s ban on same-sex
marriage
made
a
morally
outrageous
trade-off,
compromising sacred values relating to marriage and
sexuality in order to accommodate values relating to
equality for gays and lesbians.242 For those voters,
organizations like Fair Courts for Us then compounded the
moral offense when they asked voters to tolerate the
justices‟ actions lest a culture of vigorous anti-retention

239. See supra notes 82-87 and accompanying text (describing the Tennessee
election).
240. See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text (describing the Nebraska
election).
241. See supra notes 222-26 and accompanying text (discussing taboo tradeoffs).
242. See supra notes 7, 62-69 and accompanying text (discussing Varnum).
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campaigns tempt judges to behave inappropriately.243 Even
taking time to consider those kinds of consequentialist
arguments would have been perceived by many Iowa voters
as morally problematic, insofar as such contemplation
would manifest at least a theoretical willingness to
compromise their sacred commitments.244 This kind of rigid,
insistently deontological thinking emerged immediately
after the Varnum decision came down: when Republican
United States Senator Charles Grassley said that he
wanted to take a little time just to think about whether
Iowans should amend their constitution to ban same-sex
marriage, some conservative leaders excoriated him for not
being sufficiently opposed to what those leaders regarded as
a morally abhorrent practice.245
In addition to deterring the consequentialist modes of
thinking that judges and their defenders promote, sacred
values also help to mobilize the holders of those values.
Values-driven anti-retention campaigns should rarely have
difficulty finding leaders, for example, in part because they
offer individuals the opportunity to further their own
political careers by securing the benefits of the valorization
effect.246 In Iowa, a failed gubernatorial candidate eagerly
led the charge against the three Iowa justices,247 while
Republican presidential hopefuls used the anti-retention
campaign as an opportunity to try to improve their standing
among social conservatives.248 The invocation of sacred
values also increases the likelihood that those values‟
holders will turn out on Election Day.249 In part, that is
243. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing Fair Courts for Us‟
campaign to voters to retain the judges).
244. See supra notes 223-25 and accompanying text (discussing moral
opposition to merely considering a taboo trade-off).
245. See Jason Hancock, Salier: Grassley Could Be Primaried, IOWA INDEP.
(Apr. 10, 2009), http://iowaindependent.com/13888/salier-grassley-could-beprimaried (reporting the remarks of Bill Salier, a leading Iowa conservative).
246. See supra note 228 and accompanying text (noting the valorization effect).
247. See Pettys, supra note 7, at 724-29 (discussing the leadership of Bob
Vander Plaats, who had just been defeated in the Iowa gubernatorial primary).
248. See id. at 736 (quoting remarks made by Mike Huckabee, a 2008
presidential hopeful, and Newt Gingrich, a 2012 presidential hopeful).
249. See supra note 229 and accompanying text (noting that citizens are more
likely to vote when they perceive that their sacred values are in play).
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because voting against the targeted judges‟ retention
provides an opportunity both to condemn those judges for
their perceived moral transgressions, and to cleanse oneself
from any contamination that one might feel as a result of
one‟s association with the moral transgressors or as a result
of merely witnessing the moral transgressions themselves.250
B. Alienation, Discounts, and Empirical Uncertainty
Suppose pro-retention forces manage to surmount those
obstacles and persuade morally outraged voters that—
notwithstanding their sacred commitments—they ought to
think seriously about the consequences of ousting judges in
response to their controversial rulings. When the
conversation does turn to consequences, targeted judges and
their defenders will encounter additional hurdles.
1. Alienation and Perceptions of Fairness. The same
sacred values that deter their holders from deploying
consequentialist modes of reasoning will continue to loom
large if those angry voters weigh the perceived benefits of
ousting controversial judges against the threatened
consequences of such ousters. After all, sacred values do not
lose their moral pull merely because a voter reluctantly
agrees to consider trading those values off against other
social goods. Pro-retention forces might thus try to
counteract angry voters‟ moral outrage with a moral
argument of their own, namely: all litigants are morally
entitled to fair and impartial courts; ousting judges in
response to controversial rulings will make it less likely
that litigants will have the benefit of fair and impartial
courts in the future; it thus is morally wrong to oust judges
in response to controversial rulings.251 But for voters who
come to the table already morally outraged by a targeted
judge‟s actions, this proposed line of consequentialist moral
reasoning is problematic. As a number of philosophers have
pointed out, it is hard to embrace a consequentialist moral
argument when doing so requires one to alienate oneself

250. See supra note 224 and accompanying text (describing the dynamics of
moral cleansing).
251. See supra Part I.C (describing comparable arguments).
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from one‟s deontological convictions and commitments.252 As
David McNaughton and Piers Rawling concisely observe,
“[i]f morality cuts us off from some important part of
ourselves then it appears unattractive” and is difficult to
accept.253
Alienation of this sort is a problem for pro-retention
consequentialist arguments that ask voters to compromise
some of their core moral convictions. The threat of such
alienation provides morally outraged voters with a powerful
incentive to find some means by which to rationalize
dismissing or downplaying the consequentialist threats that
judges and their defenders describe. One should not
underestimate those powers of rationalization.
Consider, for example, values relating to procedural
fairness—widely held values that lie at the heart of judges‟
consequentialist arguments. Empirical research has yielded
two insights that are important for our purposes here. First,
when a decision-making process yields an outcome that a
person regards as morally outrageous, she is more likely to
regard that process as procedurally unfair than when it
yields a result that she finds morally acceptable.254 A person
252. See, e.g., Dean Cocking & Justin Oakley, Indirect Consequentialism,
Friendship, and the Problem of Alienation, 106 ETHICS 86, 111 (1995)
(“[Consequentialists have] attempt[ed] to overcome the problem of alienation
which many have thought besets consequentialism in its direct forms . . . .”);
Peter Railton, Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality, in
CONSEQUENTIALISM AND ITS CRITICS 93, 93 (Samuel Scheffler ed., 1988)
(observing that a moral regime may be “self-defeating” if it “bring[s] with it
alienation—from one‟s personal commitments, from one‟s feelings or sentiments,
from other people, or even from morality itself”); see also id. at 125-26 (stating
that for a moral regime to be appealing, its proponents must show that it would
“not alienate us from the particular commitments that make life worthwhile”);
Scott Woodcock, When Will Your Consequentialist Friend Abandon You for the
Greater Good?, 4 J. ETHICS & SOC. PHIL., no. 2, Feb. 2010, at 1, 3-4 (noting that a
number of philosophers have wrestled with the apparent tension between the
deontological bonds of friendship and certain consequentialist modes of moral
argument); cf. Michael Stocker, The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories,
73 J. PHIL. 453, 453 (1976) (“Modern ethical theories . . . fail to examine motives
and the motivational structures and constraints of ethical life.”).
253. David McNaughton & Piers Rawling, Deontology and Value, in
PHILOSOPHY, THE GOOD, THE TRUE, AND THE BEAUTIFUL 197, 197 (Anthony O‟Hear
ed., 2000).
254. Linda J. Skitka, Do the Means Always Justify the Ends, or Do the Ends
Sometimes Justify the Means? A Value Protection Model of Justice Reasoning, 28
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might believe that a court‟s decision-making procedures are
fair as a general matter, for example, but her appraisal of
the court‟s procedures is likely to be degraded if the court
issues what she regards as a morally objectionable ruling.255
Second, when strong moral convictions are in play, people
sometimes reduce their commitment to procedural fairness
when doing so makes those moral convictions easier to
vindicate.256 In more than one study, “American citizens
appeared to be more concerned that government and legal
authorities arrived at [those citizens‟] morally mandated
outcome[s] than whether the government and legal
authorities dignified and respected the involved parties‟
rights to due process.”257
All of this spells trouble for the argument that retaining
controversial judges is necessary in order to preserve the
fairness of a state‟s judicial proceedings.258 When a state
court issues a ruling that a voter finds morally
objectionable, the voter is likely to reduce his or her
appraisal of the fairness of that court‟s decision-making
procedures. A consequentialist plea to preserve the status
quo with respect to fairness is thus not received in the way
that its proponents intend—for many morally indignant
voters, the courts already are adjudicating cases unfairly,
and so the status quo is something that ought to be changed
(by removing the offending judges) rather than preserved.
Similarly, when pro-retention forces argue that ousting
judges in response to controversial rulings might lead to
unfair adjudications in the future, angry voters are not as
likely as they might otherwise be to assign those fairness
concerns great weight. Rather, those voters are likely to
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 588, 594 (2002); see also id. (“[F]air
procedures do not ameliorate the sense of injustice people experience when
[what they regard as] a morally mandated outcome is threatened or rejected.”).
255. See id. (summarizing the results of a study concerning values involving
civil rights for homosexuals, access to abortion, and public services for illegal
immigrants).
256. See Linda J. Skitka & Elizabeth Mullen, The Dark Side of Moral
Conviction, 2 ANALYSES SOC. ISSUES & PUB. POL‟Y 35, 38 (2002) (“Having a moral
mandate has . . . been associated with a disregard for procedural protections and
due process.”).
257. Id. at 39.
258. See supra Part I.C (describing the widespread claim that anti-retention
campaigns are a threat to the fairness and impartiality of states‟ courts).
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lessen their commitment to fairness if that commitment
would stand as an obstacle to vindicating the important
moral values that they believe the targeted judges violated
in their controversial rulings. In these ways, angry voters
can rationalize their rejection of the consequentialist
arguments that judges and their defenders advance, and
can thereby fend off the sense of alienation that would flow
from compromising some of their core deontological
commitments.
2. Discounting the Future. Nearly a century and a half
ago, economist and philosopher William Stanley Jevons
observed that “a future feeling is always less influential
than a present one.”259 Human beings‟ seemingly hard-wired
tendency to discount the future when making intertemporal
choices260 poses yet another set of obstacles for pro-retention
forces‟ consequentialist arguments.
To a certain degree, assigning future feelings and
events less weight than present ones is a perfectly sensible
thing for decision-makers to do. After all, one intuitively
recognizes that one‟s predictions about the future nearly
always carry a measure of uncertainty, and it is appropriate
to discount the weight that one assigns to those predictions
accordingly.261 When confronted with the risk that a given
choice will cause one to suffer unpleasant consequences, for
example, one must assess the odds that the threatened
consequences will indeed materialize, one must predict the
magnitude of the losses that those consequences will inflict,
and one must judge the likelihood that one will indeed
perceive those consequences as losses when they actually
259. W. STANLEY JEVONS, THE THEORY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 72 (5th ed. 1957)
(1871).
260. An intertemporal choice is a choice “involving trade-offs among costs and
benefits occurring at different times.” Shane Frederick et al., Time Discounting
and Time Preference: A Critical Review, in TIME AND DECISION: ECONOMIC AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERTEMPORAL CHOICE 13, 13 (George
Loewenstein et al. eds., 2003).
261. See GEORGE AINSLIE, PICOECONOMICS: THE STRATEGIC INTERACTION OF
SUCCESSIVE MOTIVATIONAL STATES WITHIN THE PERSON 81 (1992) (“[T]here has
[long] been a stubborn belief that it is irrational to discount for delay beyond an
allowance for uncertainty . . . .”); JEVONS, supra note 259, at 72 (“To secure a
maximum of benefit in life, all future events, all future pleasures or pains,
should act upon us with the same force as if they were present, allowance being
made for their uncertainty.” (emphasis added)).
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occur.262 To the extent one is not certain about those
matters, it is rational to proportionately discount the weight
of the threatened consequences when weighing the pros and
cons of one‟s decision-making options.
In many instances, however, rational discounting for
uncertainty is just the beginning. We have a welldocumented, seemingly innate tendency to go even further,
discounting the future far beyond what rationally
accounting for uncertainty would require.263 As psychiatrist
George Ainslie has explained, “living mostly for the present
moment is our natural mode of functioning.”264 Numerous
studies demonstrate that individuals often have a strong
preference for present-day rewards over delayed rewards of
greater quality or value.265 People thus often make “timeinconsistent choices”—choices that bring a certain measure
of satisfaction in the short term but that are inconsistent
with those decision-makers‟ greater long-term interests.266
Time inconsistency thus leads to problems for the actor who
fails to behave in a manner that accurately anticipates his
or her own future needs and preferences.267 It also leads to
262. Cf. KENNETH R. MACCRIMMON & DONALD A. WEHRUNG, TAKING RISKS: THE
MANAGEMENT OF UNCERTAINTY 10 (1986) (“[T]here are three components of
risk—the magnitude of loss, the chance of loss, and the exposure to loss. To
reduce riskiness, it is necessary to reduce at least one of these components.”).
263. See AINSLIE, supra note 261, at 95 (“There is good evidence that all
organisms have an innate tendency to discount delayed rewards roughly in
proportion to that delay . . . .”); JEVONS, supra note 259, at 72 (stating that we
should not discount the future beyond taking into account uncertainty, but that
no one‟s mind is constituted in this “perfect way”); R.H. Strotz, Myopia and
Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization, 23 REV. ECON. STUD. 165, 177
(1956) (stating that it appears that most people are born with “discount
functions” that cause them to overvalue more “proximate satisfactions”
compared to more distant ones). For a sophisticated yet accessible introduction
to the literature, see Philip Streich & Jack S. Levy, Time Horizons, Discounting,
and Intertemporal Choice, 51 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 199, 199-214 (2007).
264. AINSLIE, supra note 261, at 57.
265. See id. at 58-60 (summarizing several such studies); see also id. at 95
(stating that people often prefer “poorer, earlier goals over objectively better
goals that are more delayed”).
266. See Stephen J. Hoch & George F. Loewenstein, Time-Inconsistent
Preferences and Consumer Self-Control, 17 J. CONSUMER RES. 492, 493 (1991)
(discussing time inconsistency in the consumer context).
267. See Shane Frederick, Time Preference and Personal Identity, in TIME AND
DECISION: ECONOMIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERTEMPORAL
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difficulties for others who will be adversely affected by the
actor‟s behavior.268 In the area of climate change, for
example, some scholars charge members of the present
generation with unethical short-sightedness, arguing that
they are improperly discounting the needs and preferences
of future generations far beyond what a discount for mere
uncertainty would warrant.269
When leaders of the bar and others warn angry voters
that their anti-retention campaigns threaten to compromise
state courts‟ efforts to adjudicate cases fairly and
impartially, those voters are thus likely to discount that
claim. Voters quite rationally will apply a modest discount
for uncertainty—it is theoretically possible, after all, that
most judges will stand firm in the face of anti-retention
campaigns, refusing to engage in significant fundraising
and resisting the temptation to worry about the electoral
consequences of their rulings, and it is possible that if
judges do take greater heed of the electorate‟s preferences in
the future, today‟s angry voters will regard those rulings as
praiseworthy. Even beyond those discounts for uncertainty,
morally outraged voters may assign greater weight to the
moral vindication they would like to experience today than
to the negative consequences they and others will suffer in
CHOICE, supra note 260, at 89, 89 (“[S]omeone who chooses a smaller amount of
utility now over a greater amount in some future period is clearly not
maximizing utility over that interval.”). Discussing the work of philosophers,
Frederick entertains the possibility that “a person is nothing more than a
succession of overlapping selves related to varying degrees by physical
continuities, memories, and similarities of character and interests,” such that
“discounting one‟s „own‟ future utility may be no more irrational than
discounting the utility of someone else.” Id. at 90.
268. Cf. John Broome, Discounting the Future, 23 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 128, 131
(1994) (“I shall generally take for granted the majority view [among
philosophers] that the pure discount rate should be zero: future well-being ought
not to be discounted.”); F.P. Ramsey, A Mathematical Theory of Saving, 38
ECON. J. 543, 543 (1928) (“[To] discount later enjoyments in comparison with
earlier ones [is] a practice which is ethically indefensible . . . .”).
269. See, e.g., NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 51 (2007)
(“[T]he only sound ethical basis for placing less value on the utility . . . of future
generations [is] the uncertainty over whether or not the world will exist, or
whether those generations will all be present.”); see also id. at 35 (“It is, of
course, possible that people actually do place less value on the welfare of future
generations, simply on the grounds that they are more distant in time. But it is
hard to see any ethical justification for this.”).

136

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60

the future, even if—viewed from a perspective free of time
inconsistency—those
negative
consequences
clearly
outweigh the benefits of today‟s moral vindication. The
emotions and preferences that one anticipates holding down
the road often simply cannot compete with the emotions and
preferences that one already holds in the present moment.
3. Confronting Empirical Uncertainty. Yet another set
of obstacles for consequentialist arguments concerns the
difficulties citizens face when confronted with empirical
uncertainty. Public-policy debates frequently feature
competing empirical claims about consequences. Some
assert that capital punishment deters violent crime, for
example, while others assert that it does not. Some claim
that tight restrictions on gun possession lead to fewer
deaths and injuries, while others claim that tight
restrictions make it easier for violent criminals to prey upon
innocent civilians. The vast majority of citizens cannot
make first-hand judgments about the accuracy of such
assertions, because they have not conducted their own
empirical studies. To decide which claims to accept and
which to reject, therefore, citizens often will deploy two
strategies. First, they frequently will credit those empirical
assertions that confirm their present beliefs, while ignoring
or discrediting those that do not.270 Second, for help in
navigating the field of competing claims, citizens often turn
to authorities whom they trust—and the authorities whom
they trust ordinarily will be those who appear to share their
own values. Dan Kahan and Donald Braman explain:
[W]hat individuals accept as truth cannot be divorced from the
cultural commitments that define their identities. Our knowledge
of all manner of facts—that men landed on the moon in 1969; . . .
that the paternity of a baby can be determined from a DNA test—
derives not from first-hand observation but from what we are told
270. See Braman & Kahan, supra note 232, at 579-80 (making this point with
respect to the debate about gun control); see also id. at 584-85 (“While
predictably failing to change anyone‟s mind, empirical analyses do reinforce the
conviction of those who already accept their conclusions that a rational and just
assessment of the facts must support their position.”); Dan M. Kahan & Donald
Braman, Essay, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24 YALE L. & POL‟Y REV.
149, 150 (2006) (“Based on a variety of overlapping psychological mechanisms,
individuals accept or reject empirical claims about the consequences of
controversial policies based on their vision of a good society.”).
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by those whose authority we trust. Whom we regard as worthy of
such trust . . . is governed by norms that we have been socialized
to accept. For this reason, factual disagreement can be ripe with
political and cultural conflict. If you insist that I am wrong to
believe that the Holocaust took place, or that God created the
world, you obviously aren‟t reporting that your sensory experience
differs from mine; you are telling me that you reject the authority
271
of institutions and persons I am morally impelled to defer to.

American political discourse thus frequently features warring cultural authorities on controversial issues. Relying
heavily upon their respective favored news outlets, those
authorities endlessly castigate one another with little expectation of changing their opponents’ minds and with a fierce
determination not to cede their opponents any measure of
victory.272
A split among cultural authorities is now plainly
emerging with respect to the politicization of judicial
retention elections. Judges and bar leaders urge citizens
never to oust judges merely for issuing controversial
rulings; they warn that such ousters would undercut state
courts‟ ability to provide fair and impartial forums for
litigation.273 The leaders of anti-retention campaigns dismiss
such warnings as elitist, anti-democratic rhetoric; they
advise citizens that ousting objectionable judges is one way
in which the sovereign people can take the reins of
government back into their own hands.274 We thus have a
sharp disagreement about the effects of anti-retention
campaigns: will they disastrously undercut courts‟ ability to
provide the fair and impartial adjudicative forums on which
the sovereign people depend, or will they free the sovereign

271. Braman & Kahan, supra note 232, at 584; see also Kahan & Braman,
supra note 270, at 151 (stating that, when presented with empirical claims that
they cannot evaluate first-hand, people “have to take the word of those whom
they trust on issues of what sorts of empirical claims, and what sorts of data
supporting such claims, are credible,” and that the authorities whom “people . . .
trust, naturally, are the ones who share their values”).
272. See Marietta, supra note 212, at 768 (stating that when political debate is
infused with rhetoric about sacred values, it often does not feature leaders
trying to strike a reasonable compromise; rather, it features cultural authorities
pitched against one another in an endless battle).
273. See supra Part I.C.
274. See supra notes 7-13 and accompanying text.
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people from the control of elitist judges who do not
understand their proper role in our democratic society?
That debate is not susceptible to decisive resolution
through laypeople‟s first-hand observations—citizens cannot
peer into the future and definitively see what the
consequences of sustained anti-retention activity will be,
nor are the effects of past anti-retention campaigns
discoverable without the aid of empirical research. There
thus is little to prevent citizens from taking refuge in
whichever set of arguments best suits their preferences at a
given moment in time—those who supported same-sex
marriage in Iowa could fall in line behind leaders of the bar,
for example, while those who opposed it could fall in line
behind social conservatism‟s political and religious leaders.
Moreover, faced with empirical uncertainty regarding the
long-term effects of anti-retention campaigns, many citizens
will seek guidance from cultural authorities who share their
core values. On issues like abortion, same-sex marriage, and
the death penalty, social conservatives will rely upon
prominent champions of socially conservative causes, while
more liberal-minded citizens will rely upon authorities who
have traditionally placed great stock in judicial review and
in courts‟ ability to help shield unpopular groups and
individuals from the reach of hostile political majorities.
With the two camps thus deeply dug in, consequentialist
arguments lobbed from one set of trenches to the other will
have little persuasive effect.
C. An Inherent Tension
Finally, a self-defeating tension inheres in the
consequentialist arguments on which judges targeted for
non-retention commonly rely. Those consequentialist
arguments posit that judges who are shielded from political
forces decide cases based upon the law rather than upon
reasons that they self-interestedly supply, but that some of
those same judges are likely to deviate from the law in an
effort to keep their jobs if they believe they will be exposed
to energetic political scrutiny on Election Day.275 That line of
argument presumes that, for the typical judge, there is a
sharp categorical difference in the kinds of self-interested
temptations to which she is susceptible: she can reliably
275. See supra Part I.C.
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resist the temptation to decide cases based on her own
personal preferences (even preferences that are shaped by
sacred values to which she is deontologically committed),276
but she cannot reliably resist the temptation to decide cases
based upon her desire to win voters‟ approval and thereby
avoid losing her seat on the bench (even though, if ousted,
she likely could return to the practice of law277 or pursue
some other occupation befitting her professional talents and
reputation).
It is naïve to suppose that morally indignant voters will
uncritically accept that categorical description of judges‟
powers of self-restraint. Some of them are far more likely to
perceive that pro-retention forces‟ consequentialist
arguments carry within them a critical confession—namely,
that when judges perceive that their self-interests are
sufficiently at risk, they are willing to ignore what they
believe to be the thrust of the law and to decide cases based
upon reasons that they (rather than the law) supply. But if
that confession is true, then the contention that angry
voters should spare judges from political scrutiny is largely
stripped of any remaining rhetorical power that it might
otherwise carry. If judges are indeed susceptible to the
temptation to decide cases for legally inappropriate reasons,
and if citizens perceive that their options are either (1) to
allow judges to do what they wish without fear of political
retribution, or (2) to subject judges‟ rulings to periodic
electoral inspection, there can be little doubt which of those
options many angry voters will choose.
*
*
*
*
For all of these reasons, the odds of persuading morally
outraged voters to support a targeted judge‟s bid for
retention are extraordinarily low. Pro-retention forces‟
consequentialist arguments might find traction with voters
who are otherwise inclined to sit on the sidelines, but those
arguments will have great difficulty finding a foothold with
voters who are morally indignant about a targeted judge‟s
rulings. As activists bring greater attention to judicial
retention elections, therefore, state judges‟ ability to remain
on the bench will depend less upon the merits of the
276. See supra Part III.A.1 (discussing sacred values).
277. One of my colleagues quips that “sending a judge back to practice is like
sending a cop to prison.”
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consequentialist arguments that judges and their defenders
have long advanced, and more upon whether those judges
have written or joined rulings that deeply offend the moral
sensibilities of a significant number of voters. Regardless of
their analytic merits, consequentialist arguments about
judicial independence and the need for fair and impartial
courts simply lack the rhetorical power necessary to reach
voters who are convinced that an unrepentant judge has
committed a grave moral transgression.
CONCLUSION
When retention-seeking judges confront opposition from
morally indignant voters, those judges and their defenders
typically attempt to deflect voters‟ attention from the
rulings that have sparked voters‟ anger, and focus instead
on what has become a familiar set of deontological and
consequentialist arguments.278 Those arguments are aimed
at persuading voters that it is inappropriate and unwise to
oust judges merely because one disagrees with some of their
rulings.279 Upon closer inspection, however, those arguments
are largely ineffectual. The deontological arguments are
usually untrue,280 and the consequentialist arguments lack
the rhetorical power necessary to convince outraged voters
that they ought to set their anger aside on Election Day.281
If we are persuaded by the consequentialist claim that
the rise in organized anti-retention activity threatens to
inflict lasting damage on the integrity of states‟ judicial
systems, what are we to do? There are numerous options,
but they are not all equally saleable in the political arena.
States could move toward a system of life tenure for their
appointed state judges, for example, so that—like their
federal counterparts282—those judges would remain wholly
beyond the reach of angry voters. Or states could appoint
judges to a specified term of years but then provide for
legislative or gubernatorial reappointments, so that voter
278. See supra Part I.A.
279. See supra Parts I.B, I.C.
280. See supra Part II.
281. See supra Part III.
282. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and
inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour . . . .”).
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sentiment about judges‟ rulings could be filtered through
citizens‟ elected representatives. In most states, however,
such proposals would be political non-starters. In nearly
every state in the country, citizens have long insisted upon
maintaining some form of direct electoral control over
judges‟ ability to remain in office.283
Acknowledging those political realities, at least two
options merit the attention of lawmakers, judges, and other
leaders, although space constraints permit doing little more
than describing them here. First, states could abandon
judicial retention elections altogether, but limit appointed
judges to single terms of relatively short duration. In 2003,
the ABA Commission on the 21st Century Judiciary
comparably proposed abandoning judicial elections, finding
that the problems associated with judicial elections of all
kinds are simply too numerous and too intrinsic to
overcome.284 If sitting judges did not have to worry about
winning voters‟ approval in order to keep their jobs, they
would have no need for campaign fundraising, nor would
they have any direct electoral incentive to decide cases
based upon voters‟ apparent short-term preferences rather
than upon the perceived thrust of the law.285 Sitting judges
could behave, in other words, in precisely the ways that
proponents of merit-selection systems originally intended.286
Any proposal to eliminate judicial retention elections
will surely encounter the same opposition that proponents
of merit-selection systems encountered nearly a century
ago, when they urged states to abandon elections as a
283. See supra notes 26-28 (describing states‟ judicial-selection systems).
284. JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY, supra note 108, at 70-73; cf. Republican Party of
Minn. v. White (White I), 536 U.S. 765, 792 (2002) (O‟Connor, J., concurring) (“If
the State has a problem with judicial impartiality, it is largely one the State
brought upon itself by continuing the practice of popularly electing judges.”).
285. See Michael R. Dimino, Sr., Accountability Before the Fact, 22 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL‟Y 451, 458 (2008) (“If a judge cannot be appointed
or elected to succeed himself, then the greatest pressure to conform judicial
decisions to the popular will is lessened.”). Of course, judges might still worry
about electoral ramifications if they have ambitions for political leadership
down the road, but at some point one must resign oneself to the fact that not
every conceivable threat can be removed from the process of choosing one‟s
judges.
286. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text (recounting the objectives
underlying the merit-selection system).
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means of filling judicial vacancies in the first instance.287 To
make the elimination of retention elections politically
saleable today, states likely would need to reduce the length
of appointed judges‟ terms. If those terms were sufficiently
short, voters could be assured that if they were unhappy
with a given judge‟s performance, they would not have to
wait very long before he or she was replaced. Of course,
judges‟ terms could not be so short that talented candidates
would be disinclined to step away from their current
professional endeavors for an opportunity to serve their
state on the bench. We thus would need to strike the same
balance that former Ohio Supreme Court Justice Frederick
Grimke tried to strike more than a century and a half ago,
when he wrote, “I would . . . make the tenure of the judges
long enough to induce lawyers of competent ability to
abandon the profession in exchange for that office; while at
the same time, I would not make it so long as to absolve the
judges from a strict responsibility to the community.”288
When Grimke balanced those two competing objectives, he
concluded that judges‟ terms should range somewhere
between five and ten years.289 The citizens of each state
would have to reach a compromise on where, precisely, that
line ought to be drawn.
Of course, taking this approach would carry significant
costs: some good judicial candidates might remain unwilling
to serve if the position did not come with the potential for a
career-spanning time horizon, and states would lose the
services of seasoned, respected judges when those judges
completed their designated terms. Suppose we ultimately
made the judgment that it thus would be unwise to limit all
appointed state judges to single terms of relatively short
duration. What then?

287. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text (recounting this history).
Merit-selection‟s advocates reluctantly added retention elections to their
proposed reform packages only because they made the political judgment that
they needed to “have an answer for detractors who oppose[d] plans that „take
away our right to vote.‟” Geyh, supra note 96, at 55.
288. FREDERICK GRIMKE, THE NATURE AND TENDENCY OF FREE INSTITUTIONS 457
(John William Ward ed., 1968) (1848); see also Carrington, supra note 15, at 118
(citing Grimke for this point and stating that Grimke “thought about these
issues as deeply as anyone in antebellum times”).
289. GRIMKE, supra note 288, at 456.
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As a second alternative, judges and their champions
could set aside their historic reluctance to engage citizens in
debates about the merits of controversial cases,290 and could
urge angry voters to reexamine their conclusions about
those cases‟ legal and moral underpinnings. Rather than
ignore the value commitments that drive voter
dissatisfaction, pro-retention forces could confront those
value commitments head-on, engaging citizens in a
conversation about values and their proper place in the law.
If the targeted judges themselves remained reluctant to
engage in those discussions—fearing, for example, that they
would create confusion if their remarks were construed as
adding a new gloss to their written opinions, or that their
comments might be taken as an unethical promise to decide
future cases in a particular way291—then judges‟ supporters
could carry that burden for them.
There is, admittedly, deep skepticism in some quarters
about laypeople‟s ability to engage in intelligent
deliberations about sophisticated legal matters. Calling it
one of the “dirty little secrets of contemporary
jurisprudence,” Roberto Unger observes that many in the
United States (and in other western nations, too) are deeply
uncomfortable with democracy.292 This discomfort manifests
itself in many ways, Unger writes, including the “ceaseless
identification of restraints upon majority rule,” the heavy
reliance upon courts to bring about desirable public policy
changes, and the urge to reduce public discourse about
governmental matters to discussions resembling “a polite
conversation among gentlemen in an eighteenth-century
drawing room.”293 Larry Kramer makes the same point,
observing that many are inclined to limit the field of
lawmakers and law interpreters to “a trained elite of judges

290. See supra Part I.A (discussing this aversion).
291. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text (acknowledging such
concerns).
292. ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME? 72
(1996); accord LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 243 (2004) (“[S]kepticism about people
and about democracy is a pervasive feature of contemporary intellectual
culture.”).
293. UNGER, supra note 292, at 72-73.
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and lawyers,” leaving ordinary citizens to sit mostly on the
sidelines.294
A growing number of scholars have taken issue with
that mindset in recent years, arguing (among other things)
that it insults the rational capacities of rights-bearing
people.295 My own view is that these scholars have it exactly
right, and that pro-retention forces thus should engage
morally indignant voters in a spirited civil discourse about
values and about the merits of controversial rulings. As
Donald Braman and Dan Kahan have argued, political
moderates need to “come out from behind the cover of
consequentialism and talk through their competing visions
of the good life without embarrassment.”296 In its 2002
ruling in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,297 the
Supreme Court observed that there was an “obvious
tension” between using elections to fill judicial vacancies 298
and trying to prevent judicial “candidates from discussing
what the elections are about.”299 By the same token, there is
significant tension between giving voters the power to cast
294. KRAMER, supra note 292, at 7-8.
295. See, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 14 (1999) (“[I]t
simply will not do for theorists of rights to talk about us as upright and
responsible autonomous individuals when they are characterizing our need for
protection against majorities, while describing the members of the majorities
against whose tyranny such protection is necessary as irresponsible Hobbesian
predators.”); Todd E. Pettys, Popular Constitutionalism and Relaxing the Dead
Hand: Can the People Be Trusted?, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 313, 345-58 (2008)
(identifying five reasons to believe that the American people are capable of
distinguishing between their long-term constitutional commitments and their
short-term political desires); see also id. at 316 (citing work by Larry Kramer,
Sanford Levinson, Mark Tushnet, Adrian Vermuele, and Jeremy Waldron, all
arguing that the task of determining the Constitution‟s meaning ultimately
rests with the sovereign people). See generally Stephen Macedo, The Rule of
Law, Justice, and the Politics of Moderation, in THE RULE OF LAW, supra note
143, at 148, 161 (“The ultimate conformity of our institutions with the norms of
legality and the limits of permissible discretion depends on a populace capable
of supporting a tolerable balance of rules and discretion, and of making
judgments in particular cases . . . .”).
296. Braman & Kahan, supra note 232, at 586; see also supra notes 232-33 and
accompanying text (discussing Braman and Kahan‟s arguments).
297. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
298. Id. at 787.
299. Id. at 788; see also supra notes 42-50 (discussing this and other aspects of
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White).
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ballots in judicial retention elections and insisting that it is
inappropriate or pointless to engage citizens in a
conversation about rulings that a significant number of
voters find problematic. If we do not believe voters are up to
the task of making judgments about judges‟ performance,
then we are foolish to maintain a system in which voters are
asked to decide whether judges should remain in office.
Conversely, if we embrace a system in which voters have
the power to decide judges‟ fate on Election Day, then we
should not presume that citizens are incapable of engaging
in constructive civil discourse about judges‟ rulings. We
cannot have it both ways.

